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Introduction
In the United States, people use credit card numbers, bank account num-
bers, phone numbers, driver's license numbers, club membership num-
bers, student ID numbers, tax ID numbers . . . numbers ad infinitum. 1
Most citizens assume they know which entities use a specific identifier,
usually under the expectation that only the issuing party utilizes any per-
sonal information provided in exchange for the benefits of the identifier.
Unfortunately, with a single national identification number linking various
sources of information, this assumption may no longer be correct.
The prevalent use of national identification numbers triggers an immi-
nent privacy crisis regarding control of information. As technological
advances make it easier to collate data, government agencies and corporate
firms seek to collect personal information about people either from the
individuals themselves or by sharing data with other organizations.
National identification numbers facilitate the accumulation of information
in unanticipated ways and, accordingly, serve as a focal point for this pri-
vacy crisis. These numbers epitomize the danger to privacy posed by the
organizational hunger for efficient information techniques. As each day
passes, organizations' databases grow, with a corresponding increase in
the power inequity between organizations and individuals. Possessing a
mere number reveals pages of personal information.
In the United States, many privacy advocates label the social security
number a de facto national identification number.2 Viewed historically,
the current uses for social security numbers do not belie this label, espe-
cially in the context of increasingly invasive technological advances. As the
technology emerged to misuse social security numbers, Congress enacted
privacy protections against government use. Yet, as corporate use
expanded, Congress eroded privacy laws by granting exemptions to gov-
ernment agencies and mandated that government and corporate entities
1. Many government or corporate groups issue cards identifying the bearer by
name and corresponding number. Although the cards themselves raise concerns, this
Note focuses on the numbers linking the card carrier to information maintained by the
issuing government or corporation. Cf. Simon Davies, Privacy International, Identity
Cards: Frequently Asked Questions (last modified Aug. 24, 1996), at http://
www.privacy.org/pi/activities/idcard/idcard-faq.html ("Generally speaking, particu-
larly in advanced societies, the key element of the card is its number.").
2. E.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, National ID Card Measure
Comes Before Congress; ACLU Urges Committee to Stop Big Brother (May 13, 1997), availa-
ble at http://www.aclu.org/news/n051397a.html.
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collect and use social security numbers. In the courts, protections against
the abuse of social security numbers fared poorly due to some courts' fail-
ure to recognize the dangers posed by technological advances.
With data profiling and identity numbers threatening individuals
worldwide, the European Union addressed these concerns by regulating
use of personal information.3 The United States government responded by
negotiating safe harbor provisions for U.S. businesses with EU customers.4
Due to the current lack of national privacy protection,5 the U.S. govern-
ment will likely continue to pursue a policy of exempting U.S. citizens from
international privacy protections until significant national efforts increase
citizens' control over personal information. 6 This policy, however, ignores
3. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Pro-
tection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, 1995 Oj. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Privacy Directive].
4. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000), available
at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/shprinciplesfinal.htm.
5. See Mayer Brown & Platt, U.S., EU Reach "Safe Harbour" Agreement On Personal
Data Transfers, INT'L BRIEFNG, Nov. 24, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (not-
ing that unlike some countries, the United States needed the safe harbor provisions
because "[tihere is no single national law or single point of national enforcement ....
Privacy regulation in the United States ... is sectoral in nature.").
6. E.g., Margret Johnston, U.S. to Kick Off Series of "Safe Harbor" Briefings,
INFOWORL-D DAILY Naws, Jan. 4, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, INFDLY File (describing the
Commerce Department's two-year struggle to negotiate the safe harbor provisions as
"hard-fought" and noting current efforts to educate companies on the benefits of the
provisions because only twelve businesses registered in the first month); cf. Stephen
Lawson, Former U.S. Trade Official: Privacy Headaches Will Linger, CoMPuTmwoRLD,
Mar. 27, 2001, at http://www.computervorld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV47_
ST059023,00.html (discussing a former U.S. trade official's concerns about the dismal
prospects for multinational companies trying to cope with the disparate national data-
privacy approaches given her experiences assisting in the negotiations for the U.S.-EU
safe harbor provisions). Despite the painstaking efforts to arrange the safe harbor provi-
sions, Congress recently attacked EU efforts to implement the Data Privacy Directive.
Patrick Ross, CNET News, Congress Fears European Privacy Standards (Mar. 8, 2001), at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-202-5070401.html (expressing the commitment of
some members of Congress to corporate self-regulation for data privacy and their dissat-
isfaction with the safe harbor provisions); see also The EU Data Protection Directive:
Implications for the U.S. Privacy Debate Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001).
The Bush Administration also undermined the efficacy of the safe harbor provisions by
criticizing the European Union's efforts to formulate "model contracts" for EU firms to
use when dealing with U.S. firms. Press Release, Treasury Dep't, Treasury/Commerce
Letter to European Commission on Model Contracts (Mar, 23, 2001), available at http://
wwwv.treas.gov/press/releases/po116.htm ("[Tihere is a serious danger the adoption of
the standard clauses as drafted will create a de facto standard that would raise the bar
for U.S. and foreign firms. . . ."); Glenn R. Simpson, U.S. Officials Criticize Rules on EU
Privacy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2001, 2001 WL-WSJ 2858294 (noting that a former nego-
tiator for the Clinton Administration also considered the EU's efforts as a violation of
the safe harbor agreement); see also An Examination of Existing Federal Statutes Address-
ing Information Privacy Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of
Representative William Tauzin) ("I was pleased to see the new Administration's letter to
our European colleagues questioning the so-called "model contracts".... [It] seems the
model contracts are an effort to undercut the so-called "safe-harbor" and further impose
a European privacy approach on the U.S.").
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the larger international trend toward enacting national privacy legislation
in response to the EU Directive and the increased public sentiment sup-
porting personal privacy. 7
Correcting the United States' counterproductive policy decisions on
privacy will require a substantial and comprehensive solution. Given the
multifaceted nature of privacy, it helps to limit the discussion to one issue
that encompasses the problems with the U.S. privacy protections generally.
Also, given the diverse approaches to privacy protection, models in other
countries provide established examples from which to formulate a U.S.
solution. Therefore, using national identification numbers as a focal point
and based on foreign privacy models, this Note suggests broad modifica-
tions to U.S. privacy jurisprudence that will conform current protections to
international standards while maintaining efficiency.8
Accordingly, this Note will consider the United Kingdom and South
Africa's responses to national identification numbers as informative alter-
natives to the U.S. solution for personal privacy in the computer age.9
These countries provide helpful comparative models because the United
Kingdom represents a more traditional privacy regime while South Africa
has embarked on a radical tack that incorporates technological compo-
nents. Unlike the United States, the British government issues separate
identification numbers for different agency services, and a single depart-
ment has sole responsibility for individuals' privacy. Alternatively, South
Africa recently decided to implement a national identification system pred-
icated on the use of smart cards10 that verify identity and personal infor-
7. E.g., Brian Krebs, US Businesses Slow to Adopt EU Safe Harbor Agreement, NEw.
SBYTEs, Jan. 4, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, NWSBYT File (noting that Argentina enacted
privacy legislation more stringent than the EU Directive); William New, Privacy Con-
cerns, Regulations on the Rise in Japan, NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY, Dec. 1, 2000, LEXIS, News
Library, TCHDLY File (describing Japan's desire to negotiate a safe harbor provision in
favor of national self-regulation, but noting that more than fifty percent of local govern-
ments already had privacy regulations and that privacy protections were a "politically
popular" topic for national legislation); Patrick Thibodeau, Europe's Privacy Laws May
Become Global Standard, CoMPuTEfRwom.D, Mar. 12, 2001, at http://com-
puterworld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV47_ST058498,00.html (noting that "the issue
for the U.S. is whether it can buck international trends on privacy"); Ruth Walker, With
Nod to Europe, Canada Tightens Data Privacy, CHRIsN ScI. MONITOR, Jan. 10, 2001, at
11 (describing the influence of the EU's Directive on Canada's new privacy legislation
and noting that Australia and India also passed legislation to conform with the
Directive).
8. As evidenced by the tension between the European Union and United States over
the Data Privacy Directive, supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text, any U.S. solution
must ultimately be rooted in the U.S. political system and jurisprudence, not forced by
compliance with a treaty or agreement to which the United States is not a party. Also,
any solution derived from foreign privacy models must conform to U.S. values that may
differ from the originating country. See infra Part III; infra notes 258, 364, 366.
9. To minimize issues of compatibility and possible U.S. resistance to extranational
strategies, only countries with roughly similar roots in a common law heritage were
initially considered. Differences between the political and judicial traditions of the
United States and the United Kingdom and South Africa will be noted when relevant.
10. "Similar to a credit card, a smart card stores information on an integrated
microprocessor chip located within it." Smart Card Forum, What is a Smart Card? (last
visited Jan. 23, 2000), at http://www.smartcrd.com/info/whatis/whatis.htm.
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mation using a central database. To improve information control, the
United States must resolve the tension between organizational efficiency
and individual privacy with the United Kingdom and South Africa's alter-
natives in mind.
Due to the minimal efficacy of existing protections, resolving the ten-
sion between efficiency and privacy requires a massive philosophical shift
in U.S. law, 1 albeit a return to basic principles of freedom and liberty.
The current U.S. structure for information control breaks down because
the jurisprudence for informational privacy fails to recognize the impor-
tance of every bit of personal data. Legal rights should empower individu-
als as active members of society. If organizations make decisions for a
person based on an individualized and invasive profiling, however, the
individual loses autonomy. The U.S. must formulate a new structure for
information control that restores individual autonomy and allows citizens
to dictate how personal information will be used and disseminated, while
aligning its policy with international privacy standards. To set the stage
for this solution, Part I describes the technological potential for collection
of personal information, traces the historical development of social secur-
ity numbers, and explores the U.S. legal response to violations of informa-
tional privacy.
Part II sketches brief characterizations of the United Kingdom and
South Africa national identification approaches by categorizing both mod-
els according to three aspects: information management-how the country
compiles and disseminates information; privacy enforcement-how the
country ensures compliance with existing privacy protections; and citizens'
access to information-how the country provides an individual access to
information regarding that person. 12 These characterizations supply the
raw material to establish a U.S. structure for information control.
Part III introduces the concept of structural modification and the
structural factors for evaluation. Finally, Part IV examines the effectiveness
of alternatives using the United Kingdom and South Africa's methods to
address privacy concerns and concludes that a decentralized database net-
work with centralized privacy protections and centralized access for indi-
viduals to personal information resolves many privacy concerns while
maintaining reasonable government and corporate functionality. Also, Part
11. The failure of U.S. jurisprudence to recognize the importance and precarious
position of information privacy has motivated other commentators to advocate a change
in the privacy paradigm. DanielJ. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy (Oct. 17, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (using Franz Kafka's The Trial as the literary groundwork for an alternative
paradigm to the framework for privacy concerns based on George Orwel's "Big
Brother").
12. While these aspects also apply to the United States, background on the U.S.
approach to national identification numbers is provided historically to emphasize the
critical need for a new approach implicated by the steady decline in privacy protections.
In formulating a new structure for information control, the U.S. jurisprudence is
recharacterized according to these aspects. Infra Part IV.A-C.
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IV evaluates the structure's potential operation and impact in the United
States.
I. National Identification Numbers in the United States
The most basic tension spurring the privacy crisis involves the conflict
between efficiency and privacy. The administrative efficiency associated
with numbers encourages government agencies and private firms to adopt
national identification numbers.13 References to efficient administration
by number, however, invoke images of a totalitarian state, such as Jews
branded by Nazi Germany or prison inmates referred to only by number.' 4
Identity reduced to a number eases cross-referencing among databases,
simplifies the verification process, and increases government's flexibility. 15
Yet, identification numbers consolidate information to create an instant
13. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1986) (acknowledging the use of social
security numbers to match database records as the "Federal Government's most cost-
effective tool for verification or investigation in the prevention and detection of fraud,
waste and abuse" (quoting THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECTOR SURVEY ON COST CONTROL,
MANAGEMENT OFFICE SELECTED ISSUES-INFORMATION GAP IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 90
(1984))); Green v. Philbrook, 576 F.2d 440, 445 (2d Cir. 1978); S. REP. No. 93-1356
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8152; see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SOCIAL SECURITY: GOVERNMENT AND COMMERCIAL USE OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS
WIDESPREAD 7 (Feb. 1999) [hereinafter USE OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER] (citing the
advent of computerized databases and efficiency of identification numbers in retrieving
and exchanging records for the extensive use of social security number); Peter P. Swire,
Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q.
461, 485-93 (1999).
14. A National I.D. Card: Big Government at its Worst or Technological Efficiency?
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Econ. Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory
Affairs of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 105th Cong. 21 (1998) [hereinafter National
ID Card Hearing (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU)) (referring to the various totalitarian regimes and differentiat-
ing the United States where "no American need fear the demand, 'Identity papers!'");
Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and Decisions to
Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16J. MARSHALL J. COM-
PUTER & INFO. L. 529, 569-70 (1998) (discussing identification numbers as antithetical
to democratic ideals and associated with "totalitarian regimes"); see also Callahan v.
Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 686 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding legitimate a religious fear of the
"potential for abuse of the spiritual side of humanity in a number which could act as a
universal identifier" (quoting Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 905 (E.D.N.Y. 1977));
cf. Swire, supra note 13, at 495 (discussing Nazi use of personal data collected fromJews
to impose a "systematic program" of asset seizure). Contra 139 CONG. REC. S11464 (Sept.
10, 1993) (recognizing that many people equate national identification with police
states, but believing those analogies misguided); Eric Grossman, Comment, Conceptual-
izing National Identification: Informational Privacy Rights Protected, 19 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1007, 1009, 1013 (1986) (arguing that modern government must inevitably
"dehumanizfel" citizens through identification numbers); cf. IBM, IBM MULTI-NATIONAL
CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY 70 (Oct. 2, 1999) [hereinafter CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY]
(stating that 71% of those surveyed in the United States felt that "it is impossible to
protect consumer privacy in the computer age").
15. Supra note 13; see also Grossman, supra note 14, at 1013 ("Prompt and correct
administrative action is a direct result of efficiently using and requiring a numerical
label.").
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individual profile, 16 facilitate efforts to fraudulently assume another's
identity, 17 and eliminate bureaucratic impediments to data sharing that
previously protected personal privacy.18
16. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 765 (1989) (recognizing that collection of personal information in a database
impacts privacy more significantly than summing the danger to privacy posed by pieces
of information considered separately); Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1353 (4th
Cir. 1993); Aronson v. IRS, 767 F. Supp. 378, 388 (D. Mass. 1991) (denying a Freedom
of Information request for taxpayers' social security numbers because that data poten-
tially reveals excessive information about individuals); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub-
lishing Co. v. City of Akron, 640 N.E.2d 164, 169 (Ohio 1994); BOARD of GovERNoRs OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING THE AvAiLABILITY OF
CONSUMER IDEN'TIFYING INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL FRAUD 8-10 (March 1997); William
H. Minor, Note, Identity Cards and Databases in Health Care: The Need for Federal Privacy
Protections, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 253, 266-68 (1995); see also Robert S. Peck,
Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 893, 895 (1984); cf. Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get
the Goods on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at Al, 2001 WL-
WSJ 2860297 (describing the FBI's use of an information reference service that indexes
citizen profiles using social security numbers). But cf. Beacon Journal Publishing Co.,
640 N.E.2d at 173 (dissenting opinion) (remarking that extensive use of social security
numbers in public and private databases indicates that individuals do not have any
expectation of privacy for the numbers); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No
Options At All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033,
1048-51 (1999) (discussing benefits to consumers from profiling); Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Transcript of Public Workshop: The Information Marketplace: Merging and Exchanging
Consumer Data 117-57 (Mar. 13, 2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/infomkt-
place/transcript.pdf (transcribing the testimony from witnesses on the benefits of data
exchange and profiling); Direct Marketing Ass'n, DMA Customer Assistance - Frequently
Asked Questions (last visited Jan. 19, 2000), at http://www.the-dma.org/consass5/con-
sasst-faqs5d.shtml (describing the ability of "merge-purge" programs to ensure that con-
sumers are not listed twice on marketing lists).
17. E.g., United States v. Ravitch, 128 F.3d 865 (5th Cir. 1997); National ID Card
Hearing, supra note 14, at 18 (statement of Marvin Young, Jr.) (recounting harm suffered
when person engaged in fraudulent credit and criminal activity using Young's name,
social security number, and date of birth); OFFCE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMIN., ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER MISUSE ALLEGATIONS MADE TO THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S FRAUD HOTLINE 3-4, A-15-99-92019 (Aug. 1999) there-
inafter MISUSE ALLEGATIONS] (indicating that identity theft allegations constituted 326 of
400 sampled complaints indexed from the 16,375 calls received between October 1,
1997 and March 31, 1999); see also In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999);
Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 640 N.E.2d at 169. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N,
ID THEFT: WHE' BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO YOUR GOOD NAME (Feb. 2000) (providing con-
sumer information on identity theft).
18. Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1340-41 (1992) (citing
statistics regarding the routine computer matches between databases conducted by U.S.
government agencies); Swire, supra note 13, at 496; see also Peck, supra note 16, at 895
(discussing networked links between the federal General Services Administration and
credit reporting services initiated to investigate people applying for federal loans);
National ID Card Hearing, supra note 14, at 23-24 (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim)
(citing specific abuses of social security numbers by the public and private sector perpe-
trated by culling information from government databases); cf. Kathleen A. Linert, Note,
Database Marketing and Personal Privacy in the Information Age, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REv. 687, 690 (1995) ("Information held in computers, as opposed to the old method
of paper files, can be more easily collected, accessed more selectively, is cheaper to
reproduce, can be transmitted over fax or telephone, and can effortlessly be transferred
from one database to another.").
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Currently, the United States lacks any national identification number
that officially may be used to collate and disseminate personal information
on a large scale. 19 The backbone for a national identification number
exists, however, due to increasingly sophisticated technology and the social
security number's historical development within the context of deficient
privacy jurisprudence. The U.S. legal landscape reveals patchwork protec-
tions, well below international minimums for data privacy, with egregious
loopholes that may be remedied by consulting the national identification
approaches in the United Kingdom and South Africa.
A. Current and Emerging Technology20
Technological advances leave an indelible mark on society.21 Increased
processing speed, database size, and international network systems form
an ocean of information waiting to be harvested. Within this ocean, infor-
mation regarding specific individuals floats in isolated and disparate
masses. Searching by name nets so many superfluous results that it could
take hours to verify a subject's information. In contrast, numerical identifi-
cation permits a search by means so discriminating that it usually only
nets the information desired.
Consider a simple database. The user creates a record for every
United States citizen. Each record contains fields listing that subject's
name, address, and phone number. Once created, anyone with access to
the database can query the system with partial or complete information
from one field to retrieve the entire record. With only a subject's name and
the first three digits of his telephone number, a user could retrieve a full
address and complete phone information. Add mapping information to
the database, and a user can get directions to the subject's house. The
described database only contains information publicly available through
telephone directories, but the means by which the database ameliorates the
impediments to humans manually collating the information suggests the
potential for misuse inherent to large-scale databases. 22
19. Infra Part I.B.2.a.i, ii.
20. Focused on describing the reasonable potential for and corresponding risks of
database technology, this section will not explore all technological variations and
solutions related to databases and identification numbers.
21. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1334-35 ("Characteristics of the computer shape the
way that individuals are handled and power is allocated in our country."); George B.
Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy in the Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
521, 521-23 (1990); see also Swire, supra note 13, at 472-77 (detailing behavior-modify-
ing harms to individuals and society that result from financial surveillance).
22. Trubow, supra note 21, at 522 ("When committed to paper and trapped within
the confines of a manual file, the utility of information is markedly limited."). Several
databases exist on the Internet that function similar to the database described. E.g.,
555-1212.com (last visitedJan. 19, 2000), at http://www.555-1212.com (allowing user to
search by name and location or reverse search by e-mail, phone number, or location); see
also FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER INFORMA-
TION PRIVACY, SESSION ONE: DATABASE STUDY 31-35 (June 10, 1997) [hereinafter WORK-
SHOP TRANSCIP]r (testimony of Timothy Dick, President and CEO, WorldPages) (reverse
search info). Most large information reference services adopted self-imposed guidelines
that do not allow reverse searches. WORKSHOP TRANscRIPT, supra, at 34-35, 301; cf. Indi-
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Next, add fields to each record that include financial information, 23
driving history, 24 medical records,25 criminal records,26 public records
(including marriage, birth, and death certificates), 27 travel log,28 physical
description, 29 DNA,30 fingerprints, 3 1 political and religious affiliations, 3 2
and friends and associates.3 3 Although no database currently exists that
combines all these fields under a single record, separate databases do exist
vidual Reference Services Group, Industry Principles (last visitedJan. 19, 2000), at http:/
/vww.irsg.org/html/industry-principlesprinciples.htm (principles for information ref-
erence services disclosure of information); Direct Marketing Ass'n, Direct Marketers -
DMA Guidelines (last visited Jan. 19, 2000), at http://www.the-dma.org/framesets/
dmers/guidelinesframeset.html (principles for direct marketers' collection and use of
information).
23. Swire, supra note 13, at 464-69 (citing a trend toward private companies, such as
banks and credit bureaus, maintaining databases with increasingly detailed and tracea-
ble financial transactions); e.g., Steven A. Bibas, Note, A Contractual Approach to Data
Privacy, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 593-95 (1994).
24. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30302 (1999) (originally enacted July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 973)
(establishing the National Driver Register, which tracks individuals whose license has
been suspended or revoked or who committed a serious traffic violation); see also Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., The National Driver Register (last visited Jan, 19, 2000),
at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/perform/driver.
25. E.g., Minor, supra note 16, at 254, 279-81.
26. E.g., ZDNet, DOJ Seeks to Web-enable All Crime Info (Jan. 17, 2000), at http://
wwwv.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2423015,00.html (detailing Department of
Justice push for a centralized database of criminal records kept by federal, state, local,
and tribal governments).
27. E.g., Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the
Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1153, 1173 (1997) (noting that most states
consider marriage, birth, and death certificates public record that can be freely distrib-
uted); Brian Krebs, Privacy Groups, Journalists Clash Over Court Records Database, Naw-
SBYrs, Jan. 29, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, NWSBYT File (describing the debates over a
proposal to open court records to public Internet searches).
28. E.g., Michael J. AuBuchon, Comment, Choosing How Safe is Enough: Increased
Antiterrorist Federal Activity and Its Effect on the General Public and the Airport/Airline
Industry, 64J. AIR L. & COM. 891, 894 n.17 (1999) (describing a method for generating
airline passenger profiles); cf. Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Lost? The Government
Knows Where You Are: Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of
Privacy, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 103 (1998) (discussing changes in federal regulations
that allow location .tracking for individuals using cellular phones).
29. Photographs provide a detailed physical description. E.g., Domingo R. Tan,
Comment, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet Data Protec-
tion Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 Loy. L.A. IN'r'L & COMP.
Lj. 661, 661 n.2 (1999) (referring to a private company collecting photographs from
several state motor vehicle agencies).
30. E.g., Dan L. Burk, DNA Identification Testing: Assessing the Threat to Privacy, 24
U. TOL. L. REv. 87, 95-96 (1992).
31. E.g., School Lunch? Let Fingers Do the Paying, DaEsE-r NEws, Jan. 25, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library, DESNWS File (describing a school lunch program in Pennsylvania
that uses fingerprints, instead of cash). See generally John D. Woodward, Biometric Scan-
ning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns - Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT.
L. Rav. 97 (1997).
32. E.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS, REsEARCH PAPER 93/112 (identifying Greece as compel-
ling citizens to register for an identification card that states the citizen's religion).
33. E.g., Sovern, supra note 16, at 1034 n.2 (referring to debtors' use of databases
listing neighbors).
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that track some of this information. 34
Networked databases and identification numbers consolidate the dis-
parate information for effortless retrieval by database users. Given the
capacity to interlink databases in a network, a user would not need a sin-
gle, complete database to retrieve records.35 With simply a name and
phone number, networked databases result in an instantaneous subject
profile.36 Introducing identity numbers simplifies the process further for
the database user.37 Assuming assignment of a unique identification num-
ber to each subject,38 users can retrieve information from networked
databases without cross-referencing multiple fields to authenticate a sub-
ject's identity. Instead of searching through a list of people with a given
34. Supra notes 23-33; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 16, at 18-115 (tran-
scribing testimony from witnesses on the breadth of personal data collected by direct
marketers and information services and the extent of database sharing between compa-
nies); USE OF mE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, supra note 13, at 7-8 (noting that one infor-
mation reference service maintained more than 12,000 "discrete databases" searchable
over private networks or the Internet, containing personal information ranging from
public records to personal identifying data-name, address, date of birth, and social
security number); Simpson, supra note 16 (detailing the contents of one information
service to include "data ranging from motor-vehicle, driver and boat registrations, liens
and deed transfers to phone listings, military records and voter rolls" and recounting the
company's claim that "it has records on nearly every American with a credit card"); cf.
Andrew L. Shapiro, Privacy for Sale: Peddling Data on the Internet, NATION, June 23, 1997,
LEXIS, News Library, NATION File ("Privacy experts estimate that the average American
is profiled in at least twenty-five, and perhaps as many as 100, databases.").
35. Cf. Swire, supra note 13, at 469 ("In an increasingly networked world, the exis-
tence of ... databases can easily mean that data will spread from one [database] to
another.").
36. Supra note 16 and accompanying text. As an example, consider two databases.
The first database stores the mapping directory for every U.S. citizen, as described in the
previous example. The second database stores each citizen's name, address, and physi-
cal description. The databases are networked so that information passes freely between
them. Instead of culling data from the databases individually, a user with access can
submit a single inquiry using a subject's name and address. Since both databases index
records by name and address, one system would return the phone number and mapping
data, and the other system would return a physical description. The user's computer
could combine the information and present the entire result to the user as a single
record. From the user's perspective, a name and address would retrieve the correspond-
ing phone number, mapping information, and physical description with a single query.
37. E.g., Grossman, supra note 14, at 1012. Phone numbers cannot be considered
identity numbers because they are not unique to the individual. The resultant necessity
of verification procedures would hamper government and corporate efficiency.
38. Cf. Nadine Strossen, National Health Care: Will Big Brother's Doctor be Watching
Us?, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 438, 442 (1995) (indicating that the social security
number is not a good candidate for a national identification number because of the
"high percentage of duplicate, fraudulent and inaccurate numbers"); MIsusE ALLEGA-
TIONS, supra note 17, at 3-4 (identifying numerous claims of identity theft from a sample
of 400 complaints between October 1, 1997 and March 31, 1999); Soc. Security Admin.,
The Most Misused Social Security Number of All Time (last visited Feb. 11, 2000), at http:/
/www.ssa.gov/history/misused.html (describing the mass confusion caused by sample
social security cards included with wallets). But cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 710
(1986) ("Social Security numbers are unique numerical identifiers. . ."); USE OF THE
SOCIAL SECUaRT NUMBER, supra note 13, at 3 ("[T]he SSN has come to be viewed by many
as a national identifier because almost every American has an SSN, and each is
unique.").
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name in a particular city, the user only needs to enter the identification
number.39
However, technology breeds reliance. During the 1800s, people
believed science would provide all the answers to life's problems.40 That
reliance faded, only recently to be replaced by the belief that computers
embody the grail of convenience.4 1 Revered for an unerring exactitude,
computer systems simplify daily tasks and process week-long projects in
minutes.42 Users rely on the seeming perfection of information processed
through computers.
As a consequence, assigning identification numbers subordinates the
subject's identity to his assigned number and associated database file.43
Even without the possibility of data entry errors, however, computers do
not mirror reality.44 Once a user introduces identification numbers, reli-
ance on system information threatens the subject's real identity.4 5 Ulti-
mately, identification numbers distort reality by reifying database
information. 46 In other words, the database information thrives indepen-
dently of the actual subject described, and the subject's use of his identifi-
cation number constitutes the only link between reality and the database.
If someone obtained the identification number and some supporting infor-
mation, then that person could appropriate the subject's database iden-
39. For example, consider the simple U.S. mapping directory database. If the user
only submits a name to the database, the system retrieves the hundreds of records for
people using that name in the United States. If the user queries the system with a name
and address, the number of records shrinks considerably. However, numerous records
may still exist. Multiple individuals with the same name may live at a given residence or
have used the address; for example, a father and son with the same name may live
together. To eliminate this multiplicity of records, the user could enter a unique identifi-
cation number that distinguishes the father and son. Yet, once unique identification
numbers are available, the user need not preliminarily narrow results using a name and
address. From the initial query, the user could merely submit the identification number
to retrieve the desired record.
40. Encyclopoedia Britannica, History of Science (last visited Jan. 19, 2000), at http://
wvw.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/0/0,5716,117480+13,00.html ("One savant went
so far as to express pity for those who would follow him and his colleagues, for they, he
thought, would have nothing more to do than to measure things to the next decimal
place.").
41. References to the convenience of computers dominate the media, accounting for
554 news accounts in the previous two years. Search of LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File (Jan. 19, 2000) (search for records containing "convenience w/3 computer").
42. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1335-39 (discussing computers' ability to rapidly
process information).
43. E.g., Komuves, supra note 14, at 571; Grossman, supra note 14, at 1013; see also
Solove, supra note 11 (arguing for an emphasis on the privacy implications raised by the
dehumanizing effect of modern information collection).
44. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1339, 1341-43 (warning that the capabilities of com-
puters are limited by the people that enter data and the software programmers).
45. Supra note 14.
46. INFO. POL'Y COMM., NAT'L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PRO-
MOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COM-
MENT Part III (April 1997); see also Martin Bright, Identity Cards: A Double-Edged Issue,
GUARDIAN, May 30, 1995, 1995 WL 7606007 ("Ifnformation could be stored and spread
without an individual's consent, errors replicated and automatic decisions made about
people on the basis of limited information.").
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tity. 4 7 Further, due to the increasing trend toward electronic storage of
documents, access to identification numbers provides more information
than originally provided by or associated with the identified subject.48
Networked database users and subjects may consider these potential
difficulties minimal risks, outweighed by the benefits gained through the
ability to respond promptly to a subject's needs.49 An automobile insur-
ance company might monitor the subject's driving history to automatically
reduce rates when he maintains a clean record. The State Department
could track the purchase of airline tickets to foreign countries and contact
individuals with travel advisory information. The Department of Health
and Human Services could query medical records to create lists of individ-
uals that need specific vaccinations.50 Networked databases could provide
government or corporate users the capacity to accommodate individual
needs in limitless combinations.
Yet, for every hypothetical benevolent use, one can also imagine a
malignant abuse of networked databases. Law enforcement officers could
retrieve financial or medical information without a search warrant or con-
sent. Airlines could refuse to carry individuals fitting a specific medical or
travel profile. Furthermore, anyone with access to the databases could cull
information about individuals in need of monetary, medical, or other assis-
tance and utilize that information for financial gain. For example, some-
one seeking victims to defraud could generate a list of individuals
diagnosed with terminal cancer and no surviving family. The infinite ben-
eficial applications for networked databases remain shadowed by the limit-
less misuses.
Additionally, commentators have noted other concerns considered
inherent to uses for large-scale databases and identification numbers,
including "mission creep," the chilling effect on subjects' activities, and
data security. Mission creep refers to the gradual expansion of data usage
for purposes beyond those that justified the initial collection of informa-
tion.51 Critics worry about the subject's resultant loss of information con-
47. E.g., supra note 17.
48. By querying a document database, a user could search the text of documents for
a subject's identification number and retrieve documents and information not available
under records indexed by the identification number. E.g., Baker v. Dep't of the Navy,
814 F.2d 1381, 1382-84 (9th Cir. 1987) (limiting the protections of the Privacy Act,
infra Part I.B.2.a.i, b.i, to records retrievable by "personally identifiable information" and
denying plaintiff's claim to amend or purge documents about the plaintiff because the
Navy did not index the documents by plaintiff's "personally identifiable information,"
even though the document would be retrievable by a textual search of the database
records).
49. Grossman, supra note 14, at 1022-29 ("An analysis of the actual impact of the
use of a national identifier, however, indicates that informational privacy is only mini-
mally implicated."); see also Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1332 (noting the necessity of
government information collection to administer services and benefits for citizens).
50. These examples present potential uses of current databases maintained by the
government or corporate entities if networked with a proposed audience or recipient for
that information.
51. Swire, supra note 13, at 497-500 (arguing that economies of scale analysis
explains the rationale for expanding database uses but that privacy interests advocate
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trol where, for example, an identification number is created to track
benefits, but slowly expands to a national identification number that
tracks all personal information.52
On the other hand, the chilling effect on activities refers to the deleteri-
ous influence that information collection and use will have on behavior, as
people become better educated about the extent of data usage. 53 Consum-
ers could forego technological options in favor of activities less prone to
electronic tracking, or individuals may take special precautions to counter-
act information collection methods.54 To stress the detrimental impact on
the individual and the system, consider a person that refuses to use the
internet out of legitimate tracking concerns55 or spends an inordinate
amount of time developing means to inhibit or avoid data collection.56
Finally, worries about data security refer to doubts that sufficient security
measures exist to protect personal information in databases from unautho-
rized access. This includes both unofficial use by normal users 57 and
illicit retrieval by hackers and crackers.58
against allowing any extensive use of personal information databases due to the poten-
tial "slippery slope"); see also Doe v. Herman, No. CIV.A.297CV00043, 1999 WL
1000212, at *9 (W.D. Va. Oct. 29, 1999) (Sargent, Mag. J.) (barring the Department of
Labor from claiming that the collection of social security numbers for benefit eligibility
purposes justified subsequent use of the numbers as case identifiers for dissemination
in hearing notices and published opinions); Strossen, supra note 38, at 441-2 ("History
is replete with examples of information systems being created for a limited purpose, only
to be expanded at a later date.").
52. Id.; see also infra Part I.B.1 (tracing a similar development in social security
numbers).
53. Supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Peck, supra note 16, at 898-99
("The chilling effect of a loss of privacy is the undesirable incentive to conform to per-
ceived societal norms rather than assert one's individuality in ways that may threaten to
cause a loss in personal or professional associations."); cf. Sovern, supra note 16, at
1072-73, 1073 n.202 (describing many consumers as unaware of the extent to which
businesses use personal information).
54. Swire, supra note 13, at 473-75; Rob Carlson, Rob's Giant BonusCard Swap Meet
(last visited Feb. 23, 2001), at http://epistolary.org/rob/bonuscard (making other indi-
vidual's bar codes available as a means to avoid electronic tracking of food purchases).
55. E.g.,John Markoff, Bit by Bit, Privacy Chipped Away, AuSTlN AMEcAN-STATESMAN,
Mar. 14, 1999, at El, LEXIS, News Library, AUSTIN File (discussing numbers embed-
ded on computer hardware and software that track movement in cyberspace or facilitate
identification on the Internet).
56. Swire, supra note 13, at 472-76 (describing various harms incurred by imple-
menting financial surveillance measures).
57. Id. at 493-96 (describing reasons why authorized users may access a database
improperly); Nina Bernstein, Lives on File: The Erosion of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
1997, LEXIS, New Library, NYT File (describing several cases where people with legiti-
mate access to personal information abused that access); Robert Lemos, ZDNet, Alleged
Data Theft by DEA Official Raises Privacy Concerns Uan. 24, 2001), at http://
wwwv.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2677980,00.html (detailing charges against
federal official for selling information in law-enforcement databases to private firms);
cf., e.g., Romero-Vargas v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (Social
Security Administration employee failed to follow procedures for disclosure of
information).
58. Swire, supra note 13, at 496-97 (detailing the methods by which "unauthorized
third parties" could gain access to personal information). See generally Geek Network,
Glossary, Cracker (last visited Jan. 20, 2000), at http://www.geek.com/glossary/glos-
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B. Social Security Numbers
In the abstract, government and corporate use of large-scale databases and
identification numbers invokes diverse critical response. However, criti-
cisms of a theoretical database system and identification number only pro-
vide background knowledge to evaluate the U.S. and international legal
responses to networked databases and national identification numbers.
Progressing outside the abstract characterization, the U.S. history of social
security numbers provides concrete details of networked databases using
identification numbers. Moreover, the legal context surrounding social
security numbers raises problems beyond the theoretical risks because U.S.
privacy jurisprudence forms a weak patchwork of protections and exemp-
tions to protections. 59 The historical development of this legal context
divides into three periods: the expanding use of social security numbers,
the rise and fall of privacy, and the time for re-evaluation.
sarysearch.cgicracker (establishing a perceived difference between the labels for peo-
ple that infiltrate computer systems-hacker and cracker).
59. This Note focuses largely on the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88
Stat. 1896, and the Supreme Court's recognition of informational privacy, infra Part
I.B.2. However, several other statutes bear relevance on privacy generally and contribute
to the patchwork system currently protecting citizens' personal information. E.g., Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (regulating the collec-
tion, use, and dissemination of personal information by consumer credit reporting ser-
vices); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat.
571 (mandating accuracy and confidentiality for student records); Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630 (prohibiting the disclosure to government offi-
cials of personal bank records without a search warrant); Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549 (barring cable companies from tracking customer hab-
its through personally identifiable information unless the customer consents or tracking
is necessary to render service or prevent third party interception); Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (prohibiting unauthorized interception
of any electronic transmission); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
618 (proscribing disclosure of video rental records with an exception for direct market-
ing purposes unless customer objects); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-243 (setting groundwork for Federal Communications Commission rule
requiring telemarketers to maintain a list of consumers that do not wish to be con-
tacted); Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 (limiting disclosure
of personal information within state motor vehicle databases); Communications Assis-
tance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414 (protecting conversations
over cordless phones and requiring that government officials obtain a search warrant
before accessing e-mail addresses).
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1. The Expanding Use of Social Security Numbers60
The Social Security Act of 193461 initiated the use of social security num-
bers as a means of maintaining records for citizens qualified to receive ben-
efits.6 2 When enacted, politicians specifically commented that the
numbers would not be used to implement a national identification sys-
tem.63 In 1943, however, President Roosevelt signed an executive order
requiring all federal agencies to adopt the social security number if the
agency needed an identification system.64 Despite Roosevelt's recognition
of the potential for administrative efficiency through social security num-
bers,65 his vision proved premature. Few agencies adopted the social
security number prior to the 1970s.
6 6
However, three agencies significantly altered the social security num-
ber's purpose by adopting the number for identification uses early. In
1961, the Civil Service Commission forced all federal employees to obtain
a social security number for use as an employee identification number.
6 7
The Internal Revenue Service adopted the social security number as a tax
identification number for tax returns in 1962.68 The Department of
Defense stopped using service numbers for military personnel in favor of
social security numbers in 1967.69
As the use of social security numbers spread, an increased danger of
disclosure arose after Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act of
60. While this section only describes the steady expansion of social security
numbers' use in the public sector, a similar trend existed in the private sector. E.g., IBM,
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND SECURING DATA 1-4 (1997); cf. Komuves, supra note 14, at 536-
40 (outlining current uses of the social security number by the private sector). Once
social security numbers became more prevalent in the public sector, the private sector
had an incentive to use the numbers for identification purposes in corporate databases
to facilitate verification and matching with government records. USE OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY NUMBER, supra note 13, at 13 (describing the response of corporate interests to
proposed federal social security number regulations as strong opposition focused on the
need to have some means of exchanging and verifying data with government agencies).
Therefore, the expansion in the public sector should also be understood to reflect
contemporaneous trends in the private sector.
61. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
62. Id. § 205 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2) (1999)).
63. Swire, supra note 13, at 499, 499 n.98.
64. Exec. Order No. 9397, 3 C.F.R. 283-84 (1943-1948) (ordering further that the
Social Security Board promote the additional federal uses of the social security number
by issuing and verifying numbers).
65. Minor, supra note 16, at 262; see also Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1330 (identify-
ing the New Deal era and rise of the "service administration" as the basis of govern-
ment's need for personal data).
66. Use of Social Security Number as a National Identifier: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong. 23 (1991)
(testimony of Gwendolyn S. King).
67. Soc. Security Admin., Social Security Number Chronology (last modified Mar. 1,
2000), at http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssnchron.html [hereinafter Chronology].
68. Internal Revenue Code Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-397, 75 Stat. 828 (1961)
(codified as amended at 26 I.R.C. § 6109 (1999)); see also Minor, supra note 16, at 263
n.55.
69. Chronology, supra note 67.
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1966,70 which granted citizens access to information held by government
agencies. Subsequently, in 1970, Congress legislated a mandatory scheme
for private banks and other financial institutions to obtain customers'
social security numbers.7 1 Social security numbers had expanded far
beyond their original purpose to track earnings for social security benefits
and rapidly neared use as national identification numbers.
2. The Rise and Fall of Privacy
The first sign of significant concern for privacy appeared in an agency
report recommending a more "cautious" approach to adopting social secur-
ity numbers as identification numbers. 72 A later report criticized the need
for national identification cards and rejected social security numbers as
unsuitable for unique identifiers. 73 Between reports, however, Congress
enacted legislation further expanding the use of social security numbers.74
Finally, Congress focused on curtailing government collection and use of
social security numbers through the Privacy Act of 1974.75
a. The Rise of Privacy
i. Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act prohibited local, state, and federal government agencies
from denying benefits to citizens based on a refusal to submit a social
security number, unless a statute mandated collection of social security
numbers or the government program had used the numbers for identifica-
tion before 1975.76 Furthermore, the Privacy Act ordered any state or fed-
eral agency requesting a social security number to notify the individual
whether revealing the number was voluntary.77 The statute mandated that
the agency indicate any statutory authority requiring collection of the
number and how they would use the number.78 Finally, the Privacy Act
required agencies to obtain written consent from individuals prior to dis-
70. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250. But see Aronson v. IRS, 767 F. Supp. 378 (D.
Mass. 1991) (exempting disclosure of social security numbers from a Freedom of Infor-
mation request due to privacy concerns); Komuves, supra note 14, at 555-56 (discussing
judicial protection against social security number disclosure based on exemption six of
the Act for a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"). See generally Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in
the United States, 80 IowA L. REv. 553, 592-95 (1995) (exploring the interaction between
the Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and personal information).
71. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508 (1970).
72. Soc. SECURITY NUMBER TASK FORCE, SOC. SEcuRiTY ADMIN., REPORT TO THE COMMIS-
SIONER (1971).
73. U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS (1973); see also supra note 38.
74. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603 (codified as 42 U.S.C.
405) (requiring legal aliens and anyone receiving federal benefits to obtain a social
security number).
75. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896.
76. Id. § 7(a).
77. Id. § 7(b) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(A) (1999)).
78. Id. (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(B) (1999)).
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closing collected information to other sources.79 However, disclosure with-
out consent was possible if it fell within twelve exceptions.8 0
Congress recognized the inherent dangers of large-scale databases and
identification numbers and sought to establish guidelines for the collec-
tion, use, and dissemination of records in government databases.8 1 Con-
gress intended the guidelines to ensure that each user has a legitimate
purpose, information remains accurate, and security measures protect data
from unauthorized access.8 2 Further, Congress sought to confer privileges
upon every citizen to retrieve, control, and correct their personal informa-
tion and initiate a civil suit for intentional violations by federal agents.8 3
Congress considered these protections, guidelines, and privileges absolute
unless statutory authority outlined significant public policy arguments lim-
iting their scope.8 4 Three years later, a study mandated by the Privacy
Act8 5 cautioned against development of a national identification number
79. Id. § 3 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1999)).
80. (1) to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains the record
who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties;
(2) required under section 552 of this tide;
(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and described
under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section;
(4) to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of planning or carrying out a cen-
sus or survey or related activity pursuant to the provisions of title 13;
(5) to a recipient who has provided the agency with advance adequate written
assurance that the record will be used solely as a statistical research or reporting
record, and the record is to be transferred in a form that is not individually
identifiable;
(6) to the National Archives and Records Administration as a record which has
sufficient historical or other value to warrant its continued preservation by the
United States Government, or for evaluation by the Archivist of the United
States or the designee of the Archivist to determine whether the record has such
value;
(7) to another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction
within or under the control of the United States for a civil or criminal law
enforcement activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the
agency or instrumentality has made a written request to the agency which main-
tains the record specifying the particular portion desired and the law enforce-
ment activity for which the record is sought;
(8) to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the
health or safety of an individual if upon such disclosure notification is transmit-
ted to the last known address of such individual;
(9) to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdic-
tion, any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress
or subcommittee of any such joint committee;
(10) to the Comptroller General, or any of his authorized representatives, in the
course of the performance of the duties of the General Accounting Office;
(11) pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction; or
(12) to a consumer reporting agency in accordance with section 3711(e) of title
31.
Id.
81. Id. § 2 (Congressional findings and statement of purpose). See generally supra
Part I.A.
82. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. § 5.
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until further analysis of the Privacy Act's effectiveness could be
ascertained.8 6
ii. Informational Privacy
Contemporaneous to passage of the Privacy Act, a constitutional right to
privacy was developed with implications for the use of government
databases storing personal information. This right to privacy jurispru-
dence originated in a dissent.8 7 In Olmstead v. United States, the majority
upheld the admissibility of wiretapping evidence in a Prohibition-era alco-
hol-distribution conspiracy, despite Fourth and Fifth Amendment chal-
lenges.8 8 However, Justice Brandeis argued in dissent that the narrow
language of the Fourth Amendment encompassed a broad protection.8 9
Advocating recognition of a right to privacy, Brandeis relied on the philo-
sophical values motivating passage of the Fourth Amendment and focused
on the desire to protect freedom from government interference.90
After thirty-seven years, the Supreme Court invoked a nebulous inter-
pretation of the Constitution to justify a right to privacy. 91 In Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Court held that a right to privacy exists that protects a
married couple's use of contraceptives from government intrusion.9 2 The
Court applied an analysis similar to Brandeis's reliance on values not
explicitly stated in the Constitution.93 Basing its holding on the principles
underlying the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, the Court recognized the values of the Bill of Rights as establishing
"zones of privacy" that required constitutional protection.9 4
Subsequently, the Court examined these zones and constrained the
right to privacy to interests deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty. ' 95 Then, in Paul v. Davis, the Court confronted the
privacy interests implicated by public officials' disclosure of personal infor-
mation.96 In Davis, the Chief of Police circulated a photograph of Davis on
a list of "active shoplifters," based on Davis's arrest for a charge that had
86. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SocI.
ETY (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY STUDY].
87. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope .... They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone."); cf. Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890) (setting a founda-
tion for the concepts that Brandeis would later introduce in his dissent).
88. 277 U.S. 438.
89. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
92. Id.
93. Compare id. at 484-85, with Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
This approach to constitutional interpretation has been severely criticized. Griswold,
381 U.S. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting). But see Peck, supra note 16, at 903-05.
94. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)); see also Gary R. Clouse, Comment, The Constitutional Right to With-
hold Private Information, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 536, 531 n.34 (1982).
96. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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been dismissed prior to the list's distribution.97 The Court relied on the
limited scope of the right to privacy to conclude that the right only pro-
tected information related to "fundamental" activities.9 8 Expounding on
this fundamental rights analysis, the Court confined the activities largely to
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rear-
ing and education." 99 Applying the test, the Court concluded that the
arrest information did not qualify as a fundamental activity. 10 0
However, as computers became more prevalent and social security
numbers requisite, another Supreme Court dissent set the foundation for a
parallel line of cases to the right to privacy.10 1 In a 1974 challenge to the
Bank Secrecy Act, 10 2 Justice Douglas argued that citizens have a privacy
interest against disclosure of information that potentially reveals intimate
details of their lives, such as the mandatory social security number disclo-
sure under the Act. 10 3 Furthermore, Douglas contended that citizens have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank account information to pre-
clude a bank's disclosure of personal information to the government. 10 4
In 1977, with a tension between the Davis case and Douglas's dissent,
the Court decided the constitutionality of a state statute requiring disclo-
sure of prescriptions for specified drugs.' 0 5 In Whalen v. Roe,10 6 the Court
avoided the need for a fundamental activity analysis by characterizing the
right to privacy as protecting two distinct interests, "avoiding disclosure of
personal matters" and "independence in making certain dnds of impor-
tant decisions."10 7 The Court acknowledged Douglas's dissent in discuss-
ing the first branch of the right to privacy.' 0 8 Yet, to resolve the tension,
the Court recognized Davis as controlling for the second branch. The
Court evaded the fundamental activity analysis by establishing the distinc-
tion, but proceeded to uphold the statute as posing no significant threat to
privacy. 10 9 The Court's distinction, however, failed to address the appar-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 712-13 (citing Palho, 302 U.S. at 325).
99. Id. at 713.
100. Id.
101. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 79 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing), cited with approval in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.25 (1977) (using Califor-
nia Bankers to support a holding that constitutional privacy recognizes an "individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"); see also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
306, 329 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (expressing alarm at the dangers of
networked databases and social security numbers' use).
102. Pub. L. No. 91-508 (1970); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
103. Id.; California Bankers, 416 U.S. at 85-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. California Bankers, 416 U.S. at 88-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 599-600.
108. Id. at 599 n.25.
109. Id.; see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-59 (1977) (apply-
ing the distinction and weighing the importance of the President's privacy interest and
reasonable expectation of privacy against the public interest in disclosure). Neither case
explicitly adopts a balancing approach to informational privacy, but the applied analysis
indicates a weighing of factors. Id.; Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and
Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Pri-
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ent factual tension between the Whalen holding and Davis, which rejected a
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure based on the fundamental activity
analysis. 110 The Court set adrift this uncertain notion of informational
privacy and failed to return significantly to the subject.1 11
b. The Fall of Privacy
i. Privacy Act of 1974
Unfortunately, the legislature failed to sustain the promising spirit of the
strongly worded Privacy Act. Congress failed to rectify significant loop-
holes in the privacy regulations and started to enact statutes that created
piecemeal exemptions for federal agencies and state programs. Three regu-
latory gaps in the Privacy Act of 1974 severely limited the strength of the
protections. First, the statute utterly failed to restrict the practices of cor-
porate entities or confer upon individuals any right of action against state
or local governments that violate the protections;112 only a federal execu-
tive or independent regulatory agency would be subject to citizen suits for
violations. 113 Even against federal agencies, the remedies remained limited
to administrative injunctions and minimal damages." 4 Second, an excep-
tion for agencies using systems of records prior to 1975 exempted an exten-
sive array of uses.'1 5 Third, a "routine use" clause for disclosure
vacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. Rs,. 479, 504 n.88, 508-09 (1990); see also Clouse, supra note 95,
at 545-47; infra Part I.B.2.b.ii (examining the subsequent standards applied in Courts of
Appeals); cf. Grossman, supra note 14, at 1024-25 (assuming a balancing inquiry to
evaluate informational privacy claims).
110. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), and infra Part I.B.2.b.ii (refer-
ring to some Courts of Appeals that rely on Davis to minimize the impact of Whalen),
with Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
111. One case discussed the holding of Whalen in detail. United States Dep't of Jus-
tice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 769-71 (1989). How-
ever, the discussion was background on U.S. privacy jurisprudence to resolve a
construction of privacy as an exemption for the Freedom of Information Act. Id. at 762-
71; see also Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 481 (6th Cir. 1999) (referring to "any
reference in [Reporters Committee] made to this possible right [to avoid public disclosure
of information as] was mere dicta"); cf. supra note 70. Therefore, it is doubtful the Court
would consider the analysis binding precedent since it was not central to the case's hold-
ing. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 762 n.13.
112. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896; Dittman v. California,
191 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1999); Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 752 (7th Cir.
1983); Komuves, supra note 14, at 550, 569.
113. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552(o (1999) (defining agencies subject to civil action under the
Privacy Act).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g); Schwartz, supra note 70, at 587 (referring to the inadequacy
of the authorized remedies to control agency behavior); see also Komuves, supra note 14,
at 553-54.
115. Given Roosevelt's Executive Order, supra note 64 and accompanying text, the
exception for identification systems prior to 1975 exempted many federal agencies.
Brookens v. United States, 627 F.2d 494, 497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding the Execu-
tive Order as authority sufficient to exempt an agency from Privacy Act restrictions).
The Privacy Protection Study Commission authorized by the Privacy Act recommended
legislation to revoke the Executive Order as authorization for agencies to continue using
social security numbers, but Congress never acted on the recommendation. PRIVACY
STUDY, supra note 86.
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regulations became a catch-all agency exemption.116
In addition to these integrated exceptions, Congress initiated a march
of wholesale exemptions for specific government programs.117 In 1976,
Congress granted state and local agencies permission to use social security
numbers for taxes, welfare, and driver's licenses and motor vehicle registra-
tions.118 Over the next sixteen years, Congress enacted a series of acts
mandating social security number disclosure for individuals receiving gov-
ernment benefits or services. 1 9 Despite the expansive use of social secur-
ity numbers for identification, reports by several advisory committees and
statements by successive Presidents continued to decry proposals for
national identification numbers.' 20
In 1996, Congress stepped significantly toward a national identifica-
tion card by requiring social security numbers for a diverse range of public
116. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 584-87 (describing criticism that agencies exploit the
"routine use" exemption, but noting the inability to change agency conduct due to the
limited remedies enforceable by courts). Contra Doe v. Herman, No.
CIV.A.297CV00043, 1999 WL 1000212, at *11 (W.D. Va. Oct. 29, 1999) (Sargent, Mag.
J.) (enforcing strictly the statutory requirement that "routine uses" be published in the
Federal Register).
117. E.g., Komuves, supra note 14, at 550 ("[W]hen one considers how many excep-
tions Congress has granted for SSN collection and use, the exceptions clearly swallow
the general rule."). However, in 1990, Congress granted a respite from the onslaught of
Privacy Act exceptions by addressing a failure to regulate automated database compari-
sons between government agencies. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1999)); see also Schwartz, supra note 70, at 587-89 (discussing the benefits and short-
comings of the amendments). The amendments imposed procedural safeguards on
agencies matching database information with other government entities. Id. The Act
required agencies to obtain written matching agreements with the other agency involved
that specified the match's purpose, cost, benefit, and description. Computer Matching
and Privacy Protection Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o) (1999)). Further, prior to adverse action regarding government
benefits, the amendments required agencies to verify information or notify persons
matched and offer an opportunity to be heard regarding errors. Id. (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p) (1999)). Finally, the amendments mandated the crea-
tion of Data Integrity Boards within the agencies to oversee matching programs and
required agencies to submit a report to the Office of Management and Budget and two
Congressional committees prior to initiating any new matching programs. Id. (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(r), (u) (1999)).
118. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(c)(2)(C)(i) (1999)); see also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369
(permitting State use of social security numbers for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, Medicaid, unemployment compensation, and food stamp programs); Techni-
cal and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647 (blood donation pro-
grams); Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-296 (jury selection).
119. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 96-58 (requiring social security number
disclosure to enroll in food stamps program); Debt Collection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-365 (federal loans); Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498 (stu-
dent loans); Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242
(Housing and Urban Development programs); Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-485 (parents' social security numbers for birth certificates).
120. Chronology, supra note 67 (citing reports by the Federal Advisory Committee on
False Identification and the Privacy Protection Study Commission and statements by the
Carter and Reagan administrations).
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records. 12 1 It also set mandatory standards for identity verification by fed-
eral agencies, requiring social security numbers on identification docu-
ments. 12 2 After refusing to appropriate funds for the Department of
Transportation to implement the new identification standards,12 3 Con-
gress repealed the social security number requirement in October 1999.124
Although avoiding egregiously overt measures, Congress has established
covertly a de facto national identification number by enacting exceptions
to the Privacy Act. For every step toward respecting an individual's pri-
vacy,12 5 Congress retreated two steps in subsequent legislation. 126
ii. Informational Privacy
Even as Congress muddled the Privacy Act, the judiciary failed to uni-
formly sustain the concept of informational privacy. Soon after the recog-
nition of an individual's privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of
information-the confidentiality branch of the right to privacy, 127 courts
acknowledged two stages in information transfers that implicate the pri-
vacy interest: individuals' release of information to the government and the
government's public release of collected information. 128 For example, in
Barry v. City of New York, the Second Circuit analyzed separately the consti-
tutional implications for clauses requiring public officials to file financial
information with the state government and provisions allowing public
inspection of those documents. 12 9 Adding a further complication, the
Supreme Court expressed reluctance to acknowledge categories of substan-
tive rights beyond fundamental rights in "matters relat[ed] to marriage,
family, procreation and the right to bodily integrity."130
121. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193 (requiring social security numbers for any professional license, commer-
cial driver's license, occupational license, marriage license, divorce decree, child support
order, paternity judgment, or death certificate).
122. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Div. C, Tide VI, Subtitle D, § 656, 110 Stat. 3009-716 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 301 note (1999)) (permitting also the Attorney General to require
social security numbers from any noncitizen, § 415).
123. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, Div. A, § 101(g), Title III, § 362 (1998).
124. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-69, § 355, 113 Stat. 986, 1027 (2000).
125. Supra Part I.B.2.a.i, note 109.
126. Supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
127. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978).
128. E.g., Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559-64 (2d Cir. 1983); see also
Grossman, supra note 14, at 1014 & n.48, 1024-28. Unlike the legislative side of U.S.
privacy jurisprudence, the courts considering constitutional challenges are limited to
cases of state action. In most instances of corporate collection and disclosure, any con-
nection to relevant government activity would be too attenuated to establish state action.
Therefore, even if a strong right to informational privacy existed in the Constitution, it
would not cover many of the transactions that implicate privacy interests in the informa-
tion age.
129. 712 F.2d at 1559-64.
130. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1994); cf. supra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text (noting the initial stages of the trend away from recognizing new
fundamental rights).
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Due to the minimal and mixed guidance from the Supreme Court,131
the Courts of Appeals formulated a balancing test for a right to confidenti-
ality. 132 While the tests differ across Circuits, 133 most Circuits validate the
privacy interest in confidentiality by applying a threshold test, requiring
proof that the individual seeks to protect "intimate" or "personal" informa-
tion 134 or information subject to an expectation of confidentiality or pri-
vacy. 135 Satisfying the threshold, the validated privacy interest is weighed
against the government interest in disclosure. 136 Although the Supreme
Court's inconsistent statements influenced some courts to restrict the
131. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d
786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (remarking that the Supreme Court has made references to a
right of information privacy in dicta, but never resolved the issue); Barry, 712 F.2d at
1559 ("The nature and extent of the interest recognized in Whalen ... are unclear.");
Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134; see also supra note 111 and accompanying text. Compare supra
Part I.B.2.a.ii (detailing the rise of information privacy separate from a reliance on an
analysis of traditional rights in fundamental activities), with supra note 130 and accom-
panying text (describing the trend toward denying any rights not related to fundamental
activities).
132. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, S.C., 186 F.3d 469, 477 (4th Cir. 1999); Eagle v.
Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 n.26
(11th Cir. 1991); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1570 (10th Cir. 1989); Daury v.
Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1988); Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830 F.2d
789, 797-98 (7th Cir. 1987); Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559; United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578-79 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134; see also
Turkington, supra note 109, at 504-09 (exploring the scope of information privacy
through a balancing test); cf. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 118 F.3d at 793 (refus-
ing to rule on the existence of a right to information privacy, but, under the assumption
that the right exists, applying a balancing test); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th
Cir. 1997) (avoiding the issue whether a right to information privacy exists, but limiting
any right to only personal information). ContraJ.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088-89
(6th Cir. 1981) (declining to recognize a right to information privacy from Whalen and
applying the strict fundamental rights test).
133. Pesce, 830 F.2d at 797 n.5.
134. E.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) ("The excruciatingly
private and intimate nature of transsexualism, for persons who wish to preserve privacy
in the matter, is really beyond debate."); Doe v. Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D.
Mass. 1993) ("There are few areas which more closely intimate facts of a personal nature
than one's HIV status.").
135. E.g., Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Il]n determining
whether information is entitled to privacy protection, we have looked at whether it is
within an individual's reasonable expectations of confidentiality." (quoting Fraternal
Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1987)); Eagle, 88 F.3d at
625 ("To determine whether a particular disclosure [exposes information "representing
'the most intimate aspects of human affairs"'], we must ... assess whether the person
had a legitimate expectation that the information would remain confidential .. .
Walls v. Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1570.
136. E.g., Powell, 175 F.3d at 111-13 (implicitly balancing a privacy interest in con-
cealing gender identity with public interest in orderly regulation of prisons); Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 578 (detailing a list of factors for consideration including
information to be disclosed, potential harm from disclosure, security protections for
disclosed information, public need for information, and public policy or other legisla-
tive mandates); Doe v. Plymouth, 825 F. Supp. at 1107-08 (stating that the First Circuit
has not ruled on the scope or existence of a right to confidentiality, but polling other
circuits to adopt a balancing test).
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scope of information privacy to fundamental activities, 137 most Circuits
recognize and enforce the right to confidentiality. 138
While different balancing tests result in a less uniform blanket of pro-
tection, the differences pose no significant threat. A more serious concern
stems from courts uncritical reliance on precedent despite technological
advances that negate the precedent's reasoning. Although concerns about
information collection in databases existed prior to 1988,139 the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act 140 set a framework for understanding
and evaluating the privacy implications for networked databases.14 ' Given
Congress's recognition of a shift in the technological landscape, courts
evaluating expectations of privacy should examine cases decided prior to
that shift. While Justice Douglas noted with disapproval the use of social
security numbers with networked databases in 1971,142 several pre-1988
cases ruled that social security numbers' use does not threaten an individ-
ual's privacy. 143 In contrast, since 1988, courts increasingly recognize the
privacy risks inherent in disclosing social security numbers. 144
Unfortunately, some courts continue to rely on cases decided prior to
1988 without analyzing the underlying rationale.145 This uncritical
approach poses an especially significant threat because the commonly
cited case, 146 McElrath v. Califano,147 provides no reasoned analysis to sup-
137. E.g., J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1088-89 (denying any right to confidentiality
and applying fundamental matters analysis); Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 482 (recognizing a
right to confidentiality, but applying the fundamental matters analysis as a threshold
requirement).
138. Supra note 132 (listing only the Sixth Circuit as refusing to recognize a right of
confidentiality and the Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit as avoiding any stance on the
right's existence).
139. E.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text.
140. Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (1988) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (1999)).
141. Supra note 117.
142. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 325 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
143. McElrath v. Califano, 615 F.2d 434, 441 (7th Cir. 1980); Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F.
Supp. 1343, 1348 (D. Del. 1982); Greater Cleveland Welfare Rights Org. v. Bauer, 462 F.
Supp. 1313, 1318-19 (N.D. Ohio 1978). But cf. supra Part I.A. (explaining the dangers
inherent to national identification numbers and networked databases).
144. In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1999); Greidinger v. Davis, 988
F.2d 1344, 1353 (4th Cir. 1993); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. United States Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 852 F.2d 87, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1988); Doe v. Herman, No.
CIV.A.297CV00043, 1999 WL 1000212, at *7-8 (W.D. Va. Oct. 29, 1999) (Sargent, Mag.
J.); Oliva v. United States, 756 F. Supp. 105, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Tribune-Review Pub-
lishing Co. v. Allegheny County Hous. Auth., 662 A.2d 677, 681 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 640 N.E.2d 164,
167-69 (Ohio 1994); cf. Walls v. Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1990)
("[Tiechnological advances have provided society with the ability to collect, store, organ-
ize, and recall vast amounts of information about individuals in sophisticated computer
files .... [W]e need to be ever diligent to guard against misuse.").
145. E.g., Claugus v. Roosevelt Island Hous. Management Corp., No.
96CIV8155(MJL)(KTD), 1999 WL 258275, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 1999); In re Rausch,
213 B.R. 364, 367 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1997); In re Turner, 193 B.R. 548, 553 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1996).
146. Id.
147. 615 F.2d 434.
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port its denial of privacy claims.14 8 Ruling in 1980, the Seventh Circuit
relied on a fundamental rights analysis for privacy claims stemming from
refusals to disclose social security numbers as a condition on welfare bene-
fits.149 The court did not consider the impact of Whalen on the right to
privacy 150 or the Privacy Act on claims related to social security num-
bers.15 1 Ignoring technological advances, some courts have refused to con-
sider privacy claims for social security numbers by blindly relying on
outdated opinions that lack a sustainable rationale.
3. The Time for Re-evaluation
In sum, courts apply U.S. privacy protections haphazardly. Procedural
deficiencies allow government and corporate abuses that invade personal
privacy. Recent policy efforts to address identified deficiencies inade-
quately protect individuals, and that failure highlights the need to consider
new strategies for protecting personal information. Meanwhile, renewed
congressional concern for privacy demonstrates that the political climate is
preparing for changes; the only issue will be the degree of protection
afforded citizens.
One criticism of United States privacy protections that commentators
and agencies raise consistently is the lack of comprehensive regulation.1 5 2
The critiques focus on the failure to regulate private entities.' 5 3 In most
cases, individuals need not reveal their social security number to private
organizations.15 4 Yet, no legislation bars the entities from requesting per-
sonal information for their databases.' 5 5 When confronted with a private
group requesting unnecessary or superfluous personal information, an
individual's only remedy is patronizing a competing business, hoping the
same policy does not pervade the entire industry. 156 The extensive list of
government exemptions for collection and use of social security num-
bers' 5 7 exacerbates the problem because the number presents a tempting
148. Id. at 441.
149. Id.; see also supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
150. Compare McElrath, 615 F.2d at 441, with supra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text.
151. Compare McElrath, 615 F.2d at 441, with supra Part I.B.2.a.i.
152. UsE oF THE SocILo SECURiTY NUMBER, supra note 13, at 4; Komuves, supra note 14,
at 550, 569.
153. Id.
154. E.g., Soc. SECURITY ADMIN., YOUR NUMBER AND CARD, PUB. No. 05-10002 (April
1999) [hereinafter YOUR NUMBER]; Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility,
SSN FAQ: Private Requests for your SSN (last modified Feb. 11, 2001), at http://
www.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/ssn/SSN-Private.html (detailing private entities to whom
individuals must reveal social security numbers); Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact
Sheet #10: Your Social Security Number: How Secure Is It? (last visited Oct. 24, 1999), at
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fslO-ssn.htm.
155. Id.
156. YOUR NUMBER, supra note 154; Chris Hibbert, Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, History and Significance of the Social Security Number (last modified April
24, 1999), at http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/ssn/SSN-History.html#protect (describ-
ing steps available for dealing with corporate requests for social security numbers, from
supplying other forms of identification to seeking services or goods elsewhere).
157. Supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
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means of verification for private groups seeking to cross-reference data
with government databases. 158
Stating that "the United States has adopted a comprehensive approach
to limiting the Government's collection, use and disclosure of personal
information," President Clinton issued a policy statement to executive
agencies that espoused a spirit of heightened awareness in protecting the
privacy of citizens' information contained in government records. 159 The
memorandum and subsequent Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
instructions required each agency to assign a senior official as primary
agent for privacy issues, review existing systems and proposed legislation
for privacy implications, and submit a summary report to the OMB.160
The President's memorandum articulates a sentiment for policing govern-
ment practices to minimize invasion of personal privacy. If databases are
shielded by privacy restrictions, corporate entities and other government
agencies lose the efficiency value gained through profiling across separate
databases using identification numbers.16 1
Although not completed,16 2 the tasks set in the President's memoran-
158. See generally USE OF THE SocIAL SECURITY NUMBER, supra note 13, at 7-12 (specify-
ing the various uses of social security numbers by private entities and identifying a
primary motivation for collection of numbers as "conductling] data exchanges with
other organizations").
159. Privacy and Personal Information in Federal Records, M-99-05, Attachment A
(May 14, 1998) [hereinafter Privacy Memo].
160. Id. at Attachment A, B.
161. Supra notes 13, 35-36, 49-50, 60, 158 and accompanying text (describing the
conveniences and efficiency of profiling through networked databases).
162. While many agencies filed their required reports with the OMB, the OMB has
not released a summary of the agencies' findings. The summary will be critical to evalu-
ating the extent of agency compliance with existing privacy protections and existing
agency uses of personal information. At least one commentator has argued that agen-
cies manipulate loopholes in the Privacy Act and fail to carefully maintain adequate use
descriptions in the Federal Register. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 584-89 (describing
methods through which agencies circumvent privacy protections); see also supra Part
I.B.2.a.i, bi (discussing loopholes in the Privacy Act and use registration requirements
for the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act). Courts perpetuate agency atti-
tudes that violate the spirit of the privacy protections by deferring to agency interpreta-
tion of rules promulgated pursuant to the statutes. The courts will not defer to an
agency's statutory interpretation, but courts will defer to agency interpretation of rou-
tine use exceptions under the Privacy Act. Compare Ass'n of American Physician and
Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (declining to defer to
agency interpretation of statutes that apply to more than one agency), with NLRB v.
USPS, 128 F.3d 280, 284 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997) (deferring to agency interpretation of self-
promulgated routine use because "analysis of [the] Routine Use ... requires interpreta-
tion of neither the common law nor constitutional law and therefore, deference to the
Board's reasonable interpretation is appropriate"), and Dep't of the Air Force v. FLRA,
104 F.3d 1396, 1401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Cf. USPS v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 9
F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (deferring to an arbitrator's interpretation of agency's routine
use provision that held detailed employee personal information, including "name and
social security number ... sex; date of birth; minority status code; handicap status
code; veteran preference status code; life insurance status code; thrift savings plan status
code; thrift savings plan deduction-percent; and thrift savings plan deduction-
amount," was "needed by [a labor] organization to perform properly its duties as the
collective bargaining representative").
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dum will fail to culminate in any radical solution to the critique of inade-
quate regulation. First, the memorandum declares that "comprehensive"
regulation exists, but bases that assertion on the statutes and principles
that only provide patchwork protections. 163 Even if the memorandum
imposed duties on agencies beyond those set out by statute, the President
specified that individuals retain no right to enforce those duties.164 Also,
contrasted with Executive Orders, the informality of a memorandum to
agency officials vitiates the policy's stability by making it simpler for later
administrations to modify or ignore. 165
The memorandum exemplifies an impetus to respond to criticisms of
privacy protections, but builds upon the faulty foundation set by current
privacy protections. The improvements collapse when confronted with the
same objections raised against the foundation protections. This failure of
patchwork policies to remedy invasions of privacy stresses the need for a
structural solution.
Moreover, the 106th Congress flirted with privacy legislation.166 Sev-
eral bills proposed diverse methods to fill gaps in the current privacy pro-
tections.167 Legislators expressed increasing concern about identity theft
163. Compare Privacy Memo, supra note 159, at Attachment A ("Protections afforded
such information include the Privacy Act of 1974, the Computer Matching and Privacy
Protection Act of 1988, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, and the Principles for
Providing and Using Personal Information... published by the Information Infrastruc-
ture Task Force on June 6, 1995 ... ."), with supra Part I.B.2 (describing the problems
,vith existing statutory protections).
164. Privacy Memo, supra note 159, at Attachment A ("This memorandum is intended
only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and does not create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity . . ").
165. President George W. Bush has shown no inclination to undo the effects of the
Privacy Memo. In contrast, he has outlined a privacy plan based on the FTC's report on
fair information practice principles-specifically notice, consent, access, and security.
Michael J. Miller, Bush's Privacy Plan, PC MAGAZINE, Feb. 6, 2001, at 7, LEXIS, News
Library, PC File ("I believe that privacy is a fundamental right, and that every American
should have absolute control over his or her personal information." (quoting President
Bush)); FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-11 (July 1998).
But cf. supra note 6 (describing Bush's efforts to further minimize the impact of the EU
Data Privacy Directive even after the safe harbor provisions).
166. Declan McCullagh, Pundits Speak, HILL, Oct. 26, 2000 ("This was the first Con-
gress that took privacy seriously. The legacy of the 106th Congress won't include aggres-
sive privacy legislation - that'll happen next year - but it does include a growing distrust
of... corporations' data collection practices ...."). Contra Dick Armey, Privacy: For
Those who Live in Glass Houses (Apr. 9, 2001), available at http://www.freedom.gov/
library/technology/memo/privacy.asp (expressing the concern of the House Majority
Leader that privacy legislation should proceed slowly to avoid unintended consequences
of hastily created laws).
167. E.g., S. 2554, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing to prohibit the public display of
social security numbers for commercial purposes); S. 2699, 106th Cong. (2000) (pro-
posing to regulate the sale and purchase of social security numbers); S. 2876, 106th
Cong. (2000) (proposing massive amendments to the Social Security Act to enhance
individual privacy); S. 3040, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing the creation of a commis-
sion to study the appropriate balance of individual privacy and use of personal informa-
tion); H.R. 220, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing to eliminate government use of the
social security number as an identifier and further proposing to prohibit any form of
government-wide identification); H.R. 1450, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing to regulate
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and corporate sale of personal information and began focusing on data
privacy regulations. 16 3 Although Congress did not pass any substantial
social security number-related privacy bills, Congress opened the path for
reform, and the proposed bills suggest the breadth of reform contemplated.
Forced to weigh government, business, and individual interests in per-
sonal information, 169 Congress struggles with the nascent wide-scale
abuse of social security numbers in a global information era; the potential
for abuse is only partially tapped by identity thieves and corporate market-
ing. The wide range in proposed legislative solutions, from superficial to
structural, illustrate the possibility for significant improvement in individ-
ual privacy.170 Considering the approaches and results of similarly situ-
ated countries will inform the debate and help establish an appropriate
balance for U.S. players in the national and international setting.
II. National Identification Numbers in the United Kingdom and
South Africa
As a basis for modifying U.S. privacy protections, this section examines
three aspects of the United Kingdom and South Africa's approaches to
national identification numbers: information management, privacy
enforcement, and citizens' access to information. Information manage-
ment refers to how the country compiles and disseminates information. A
highly centralized approach collects individuals' information in a single
location and allows other groups complete access to that information. A
decentralized approach may isolate information in disparate locations or
restrict access to collected information.
Privacy enforcement identifies how the country ensures compliance
with existing privacy protections. A highly centralized approach empowers
a single individual or agency with the sole responsibility of protecting citi-
zens' privacy. A decentralized approach may leave citizens to seek enforce-
the sale of social security numbers and other marketing information without an individ-
ual's written consent); H.R. 3307, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing that agencies conduct
assessments of privacy implications resulting from proposed rulemaking); H.R. 3321,
106th Cong. (1999) (proposing that the FTC promulgate fair information practices to
regulate the use of personal information).
168. E.g., S. 2876, § 2 (expressing concern about fraud, identity theft, stalking, and
privacy invasions from the exchange of social security numbers); H.R. 3321, § 2 (expres-
sing concern about the compilation of personal information without an individual's
knowledge); Hearing on H.R. 220, the "Freedom and Privacy Restoration Act" Before the
House Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt, Info., & Tech. of the Comm. on Gov't Reform, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Chairman Horn) [hereinafter H.R. 220 Hearing].
169. H.R. 220 Hearing, supra note 168 (statement of Barbara Bobvjerg, Associate
Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues at the General Accounting
Office) ("Congress must weigh such concerns about individual privacy.., against the
government's need for timely and accurate information to control payments and prevent
fraud and abuse .... Moreover, limiting the use of SSN's in the commercial sector could
slow or hamper some of the benefits of information sharing. .. ").
170. Compare, e.g., H.R. 220 (advocating the removal of any vestige of national identi-
fication), with S. 2554 (prohibiting only the display of social security numbers for com-
mercial purposes).
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ment individually, split responsibility between several agencies, or force a
single agency to handle several obligations in addition to citizens' privacy.
Citizens' access to information indicates how the country provides an
individual access to his or her own information. A highly centralized
approach allows the individual to compile all relevant sources and informa-
tion in a single location. A decentralized approach forces the individual to
locate agencies that maintain information on the citizen and contact each
relevant agency to request information.
A. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, two defining historical moments set the tone for
the national identification number debates. In 1951, the House of Lords
struck down an incidence of "mission creep" 17 1 involving national registra-
tion identity cards issued for wartime security purposes. 172 In 1984, Par-
liament passed the Data Protection Act that established the Office of the
Information Commissioner and conferred upon citizens a right to privacy
in electronic records of personal information. 173 As a foundation for later
privacy debates, these events emphasize relevant aspects of the United
Kingdom's privacy approach.
1. Information Management
In December 1950, a police constable stopped Clarence Wilcock's automo-
bile and demanded Wilcock's national registration identity card. 174 The
National Registration Act required individuals to produce the cards when
demanded by police. 175 Although enacted as an emergency measure after
the outbreak of World War II, the statute did not contain a self-terminating
clause.1 76 Further, while created to maintain internal security, the police
appropriated the registration numbers for other purposes, including index
card files for drivers charged with criminal offenses. 17 7 When Wilcock
refused to comply with the constable's request, the subtle expansion from
171. Supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
172. Wilcock v. Muckle, 2 K.B. 844 (1951).
173. Data Protection Act, 1984, ch. 35 (Eng.) (amended 1998). Parliament amended
the Act in 1998 to conform protections to data privacy standards set by the European
Union for member states. Info. Comm'r, Preparing for the New Law - Data Protection Act
1998 (last modified July 1999), at http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk/prepare.htm; see
also Data Privacy Directive, supra note 3.
174. Wilcock, 2 K.B. 844; see also Martin Bright, Identity Cards: How the Cards Have
Fallen, GuARDIAN, May 30, 1995, 1995 WL 7606006 (providing more detail on Mr.
Wilcock).
175. National Registration Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 91, § 6(4) (Eng.).
176. Id.; see also Wilcock, 2 K.B. 884 (debating the import of "emergency" in the stat-
ute and when the statute would effectively terminate).
177. Id. at 849 (testimony of Prosecutor Gattie in response to Lord Goddard's inquiry
why police routinely requested identity cards for minor traffic violations). Other govern-
ment agencies also appropriated the national registration number for unintended pur-
poses. Bright, supra note 174 (describing uses by the War Office, the National
Insurance Office, the Central Office of Information, the British Red Cross, and the Brit-
ish Empire Cancer Campaign).
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an emergency statute to regular demands for identity documents left a last-
ing impression on the consciousness of the U.K. citizenry.
Responding to the reliance on the statute for routine situations, Lord
Goddard remarked that police should respect the purpose for which the
statute empowered officers to request identity cards. 178 After Goddard's
admonishment, the government restricted information collection and dis-
tribution to the purposes for which the department needed the informa-
tion.179 As government record systems expanded beyond index card files
and the efficiency value of identification numbers increased, the United
Kingdom engaged in debates over national identity cards, but never
adopted any national identification number.180
The resultant information management system used redundant
databases and different identification numbers for each department. For
national insurance, national health, and driver's licenses, individuals had
distinct and unrelated identification numbers.' 8 ' Although this ineffi-
ciency may be attributable to other factors, 182 each government depart-
ment maintained information in databases that lacked a uniform standard
conducive to data sharing.' 8 3 This decentralized system of information
178. Wilcock, 2 K.B. 844 ("To use Acts of Parliament passed for particular purposes in
wartime when the war is a thing of the past.., tends to turn law-abiding subjects into
lawbreakers, which is a most undesirable state of affairs.").
179. E.g., Info. Comm'r, Response by the Data Protection Registrar to the Modernising
Government White Paper, 111 13, 14 (May 1999) [hereinafter Modernising Government
Response] (raising a concern that a proposed data sharing scheme would lead to use of
information beyond the purpose for which it was obtained); see also Matthew Engel,
License to Snoop, GuARDiAN, Aug. 22, 1994, 1994 WL 9295731 ("Twenty, ten, even five
years ago, the idea of compulsory identity cards in Britain would have been unthinkable
because everyone .. .was assumed to feel [that identity cards "will be used to bully,
nanny and harass us by the police"] . . .after the police were attacked by Lord Chief
Justice Goddard for abusing the system.").
180. E.g., Green Net., Mistaken Identity: Charter 88 Briefing on ID Cards (last visited
Feb. 12, 2000), at http://www.gn.apc.org/pmhp/dc/priv/idcards.htm (noting attempts
to introduce national identity cards or numbers in the 1920s, 1978, 1988, 1989, 1990,
1992, 1993, and 1994); see also Valerie Elliott, ID Smartcards Back on Agenda, Says Min-
ister, TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 1998, 1998 WL 4818334; Richard Ford, Howard to Open
ID Card Debate, TIMES (London), Apr. 10, 1995, 1995 WL 7661231; Alan Travis, Cabinet
Shelves Identity Card Plan, GuARDIAN, Oct. 14, 1996, 1996 WL 13381409; Keith
Waterhouse, Awkward Squad of Cards of Identity, DAILY MAIL, May 24, 1999, 1999 WL
19061301; cf. Michael Cross, What can HMG.org Offer Us?, GuARDIAN, Mar. 25, 1999,
1999 WL 14125447 (noting that the national health number was issued with "the strict
promise that no other agency would use it").
181. Cross, supra note 180 ("Different government departments use different identity
numbers."); ID Number for All in Scheme to Cut Fraud, DAILY MAIL, July 3, 1999, 1999
WL 21588874 (noting "the complicated clutch of numbers held by Britons for national
insurance, child benefit, the NHS and other purposes"); Waterhouse, supra note 180
(identifying the different identity cards, publicly and privately issued, that the author
had in his wallet).
182. MODERNISING GOVERNMENT, 1999, Cmnd. 4310, ch. 1, 1 11.
183. Id. ch. 5, 4 ("[W]e have incompatible systems and services which are not inte-
grated."); Modernising Government Response, supra note 179, 11 14 (noting the lack of
"common data standards across the public sector"); see also Cross, supra note 180 ("All
[government departments] have their own ways of handling information; [they] even
hold names and addresses in different incompatible formats.").
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management minimized any of the theoretical risks from national identifi-
cation numbers in networked databases because the United Kingdom's
databases could not be linked effectively.' 8
4
2. Privacy Enforcement
Even if departments shared information with other public or private enti-
ties, the United Kingdom provided privacy protection through the Data
Protection Act, which created the Office of the Information Commissioner
(Commissioner). 185 The Commissioner operates independently from
other agencies and reports directly to Parliament.18 6 The Data Protection
Act authorizes the Commissioner to maintain a list of organizations that
collect and use personal data,18 7 disseminate information about the Data
Protection Act,188 promote and assist compliance with the Data Protection
Principles, 189 process complaints, and prosecute violations.' 90
184. Supra Part L.A (identifying the dangers of using national identification numbers
with networked databases); see also MODERNISING GOVERNMENT, supra note 182, ch. 5, 1
4 ("Government has so far followed a largely decentralised approach to IT develop-
ment."). The government has taken steps to change the existing system by formulating
data standards and linking department databases to remove inefficient redundancies.
MODERNISING GOVERNMENT, supra note 182; see also Cross, supra note 180 ("The
[Modernising Government] white paper will propose linking agencies' information sys-
tems on a colossal national intranet, which could have up to 600,000 users."). Also, the
United Kingdom has started to contemplate using nonidentification smart cards. INFO.
AGE Gov'T CHAMPIONS, FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMAATION AGE GOVERNMENT: SmART CARDs
(Apr. 2000), available at http://www.e-envoy.gov.uk/egovernment/iagc/pdfs/Smart-
cards.pdf; BBC News, Bracknell Forest Goes Virtual (Jan. 24, 2001), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sc/tech/newsid_134000/1134559.stm.
185. E.g., David Brindle, Data Registrar Warns NHS, GuARDIAN, Apr. 15, 1993, 1993
WL 9906897 (recounting the Information Commissioner's response to complaints that
hospitals and health authorities may be sharing unnecessary and detailed personal
information). See generally Info. Comm'r, A Guide to Developing Data Protection Codes of
Practice on Data Matching (July 1997), at http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk/match.htm
(setting guidelines to insure that public and private sector data matching programs com-
ply with the Data Protection Principles). Unlike the Privacy Act in the United States, the
Data Protection Act subjects public and private organizations to regulations for use of
personal information. Compare Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (1999)), and supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text, with Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, pt. 1, § I (Eng.) (defining
data controllers and data processors as anyone that collects, uses, or discloses personal
information).
186. Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, pt. 1, § 6, sched. 5, pt. 1, § 1(2); Info.
Comm'r, Data Protection Summary (last modified Nov. 1999), at http://
wwv.dataprotection.gov.uk/summary.htm.
187. Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, pt. 3, § 19; Info. Comm'r, The Data Protection
Register: Search Form (last visited Apr. 25, 2001), http://wwv.dpr.gov.uk/search.html
(allowing individuals to search the list of registered data collectors).
188. Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, § 51.
189. 1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully...
2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with
that purpose or those purposes.
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purpose or purposes for which they are processed.
4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.
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With the ultimate responsibility to protect individuals' privacy, the
Commissioner functions as an independent centralized gateway for any
use of personal information. 191 The Commissioner's independence and
singular purpose to protect privacy ensure an effective check on efforts by
the public and private sector to abuse shared databases. 192 The Commis-
sioner analyzes the privacy implications of proposed data usage without
the necessity of weighing other factors. Furthermore, unlike the Privacy
Act's remedy provisions, the Commissioner's powers of registration and
enforcement impose proactively uniform regulation.193 Where U.S. citi-
zens must individually file suit to protect their privacy rights, the Commis-
sioner processes complaints from U.K. citizens and pursues violations on
their behalf.
3. Citizens' Access to Information
The Data Protection Act also conveyed citizen-initiated rights, 194 including
access to personal information.' 95 The right to access functions in a man-
ner similar to the Privacy Act protections. 196 Individuals may request per-
sonal information stored by government or corporate organizations, and
the Data Protection Act sets procedures for the organization's response,
including regulations for honoring their requests for correction or deletion
5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for
longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.
6. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data sub-
jects under this Act.
7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental
loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.
8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate
level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the
processing of personal data.
Id. sched. 1, pt. 1.
190. Id. ch. 29, pt. 5, §§ 40-50.
191. Although the OMB features prominently in the Privacy Act and the Privacy
Memo as a similar protector, one commentator argues forcefully that the OMB's role
considers privacy only as a small factor in balances of efficiency and cost. Compare
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(v) (1999)), and Privacy Memo, supra note 159, at Attachment A, with Schwartz,
supra note 70, at 602. President Clinton did appoint a Chief Counselor for Privacy as
part of the OMB to advise the President on policy decisions, but the position did not
entail any enforcement power similar to the Commissioner. Elizabeth Weise, Privacy is
Peter Swire's Domain, USA TODAY, June 7, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File.
192. E.g., Info. Comm'r, Response of the Data Protection Registrar to the Government's
Proposals for Identity Cards (Sept. 1996), at http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk/
idcm3362.htm (criticizing proposed photo driver's license).
193. Compare Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1999)), and supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text,
with Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, §§ 40-50, and Info. Comm'r, Enforcement State-
ment (June 1999), at http://www.dataprotection.gov.uk/enforce.htm.
194. Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, §§ 7-15.
195. Id. § 7.
196. Compare id., with Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1999)).
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of records.19 7 Through the list of registered organizations that use and
collect data, the Data Protection Act provides citizens a centralized
database of locations for citizens' personal information and descriptions of
the information stored.198 This directory facilitates efforts to limit distri-
bution of personal information and ensure the accuracy of data used. Yet,
citizens must contact organizations individually. 19 9
This sketch of the United Kingdom's approach to data privacy may be
summarized according to the three aspects. Although evolving,20 0 the gov-
ernment's information management functions as a decentralized system of
mostly incompatible databases. 20 1 Privacy enforcement rests with a cen-
tralized independent government official whose sole purpose involves pro-
tection of data privacy. 20 2 Finally, for disclosure of personal information,
citizens have centralized access to data locations, but decentralized access
to the information. 20 3
B. South Africa
In contrast to the United Kingdom, South Africa has used identity docu-
ments, including national identification numbers, since at least 1986.204
Accordingly, South Africa's citizens retain a relative comfort with national
identification numbers.20 5 Yet, an interesting aspect of South Africa's gov-
197. Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, §§ 7-15.
198. Id. §§ 16-19; Info. Comm'r, supra note 187.
199. Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, § 7(2)(a).
200. Supra note 184.
201. Supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
202. Supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
203. Supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
204. §§ 5, 8 of Identification Act No. 72 of 1986 (BSRSA). During the apartheid era
prior to 1986, the government required black citizens to carry identity documents
referred to as "dompas." Patrick Laurence, A Question of Mathematics, FIN. MAIL, Sept.
18, 1998, at 40.
205. E.g., Stephen Mulholland, Say Thanks to Those Trying to Ensure a Fair Election,
Bus. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 1999, at 1 ("[Government officials] are capturing the data that will
assist the growth of a modern state in SA, a state in which, without playing Big Brother,
the authorities can locate and account for each member of society."); 'Smart Cards' Illogi-
cal, Says DP, SouTH AFRICAN PRESs ASS'N, Feb. 1, 2000, 2000 WL 4006574 ("Despite the
long queues, bureaucratic bungling and inconvenience, the vast majority of citizens
responded positively and made the effort to apply for bar-coded IDs."); Dispatch Online,
Editorial Opinion: Question of Identity (Sept. 17, 1997), at http://www.dispatch.co.za/
1997/09/17/page%2010.htm ("The most important single exercise in good government
presently under way in South Africa is almost without question the installation of the
Home Affairs national identification system ...."); cf. David Shapshak, SA Services Get
'Smart,' MAIL & GUUIN, Apr. 24, 1998, 1998 WL 10888992 (identifying numerous
beneficial uses for smart cards, but noting potential concerns of government tracking or
invasions of data privacy raised by a British author). Contra DEP'T OF COMMUNICAnONS,
A GREEN PAPER ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA 66-74 (Nov. 2000), available
at http://www.ecomm-debate.co.za/greenpaper/greenpaper.pdf; Dep't of Communica-
tions, Discussion Paper on Electronic Commerce, § 4.2 (July 1999), available at http://
www.ecomm-debate.co.za/docs/discuss04.html (raising concerns regarding data shar-
ing and use of personal information); Pamela Whitby, How to Put Big Brother on a Smart
Leash, Bus. DAY, Sept. 9, 1999, at E8 (arguing that pending privacy legislation should be
accelerated prior to implementing new identity technology).
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ernment is the recent significant revision of its written constitution.20 6 As
a consequence of the constitution's infancy, the additional rights and pro-
cedures conferred do not correlate to well-established doctrine, making it
difficult to evaluate any stated privacy protections. 207 However, the gov-
ernment's plans for identity documents provide an informative structural
model to contrast with the United Kingdom, even if the final system devel-
ops differently.
1. Information Management
Dating to the passage of the constitution's final draft, the government cir-
culated plans for a new national identification system implemented by the
Department of Home Affairs.20 8 Over the intervening years, the method
and purpose of the identification system expanded. Originally conceived
as the ultimate document for identity verification, the first tender 20 9
described a card using individuals' photographs and fingerprints. 210 With-
out discarding the verification purpose and protections, the final tender
encompassed a more ambitious effort211 to unify citizens' personal infor-
206. S. Ape. CONST. 1996; see also S. AR. CONST. (Interim Constitution, 1993).
207. E.g., Mistry v. Interim Nat'l Med. and Dental Council of S. Mr., 1998 (7) BCLR
880 (CC) (ruling that the constitution's right to privacy clause, S. AFR. CONST. § 13, does
not explicitly protect informational privacy, supra Part l.B.2.a.ii, but refusing to discuss
whether informational privacy falls implicitly within the ambit of the constitution
because the case could be otherwise disposed); cf. Barry Streek, New Bills Promote Trans-
parency, MAIL & GuARDiAN,Jan. 28, 2000, 2000 WL 4131480 (arguing that it would take
years for lawyers and bureaucrats to define the scope and effect of South Africa's version
of the Freedom of Information Act). Compare Promotion of Access to Information Act 2
of 2000 (BSRSA), with Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat.
250 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1999)).
208. Dep't of Home Affairs, Launching a New Identification System (July 29, 1996),
available at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/pr/1996/prO729.html; see also S. AFR.
CONST. of 1996 (adopted May 8, 1996 and amended Oct. 11, 1996 to conform to certifi-
cation objections leveled by the Constitutional Court, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC)).
209. "A formal offer, as: ... a written offer to contract goods or services at a specified
cost or rate; a bid." AMERIcAN HERITAGE DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed.
1996).
210. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Minister of Home Affairs, Introductory Speech:
Budget Debate before the National Assembly (Apr. 17, 1997) (transcript available at
Southern African Migration Project, at http://www.queensu.ca/samp/migdocs/
speechl.htm) (detailing the purposes of the card to "restrict persons to a single, unique
identity number" for public and private records and "ensure that the person is who he/
she claims to be," and describing the identity verification elements as a link to an
existing, centralized database of personal information, a link to a fingerprint database of
citizens' thumbs, and the presentation of a valid identification card); see also Dep't of
Home Affairs, supra note 208 (detailing the identity verification procedures as "visual
inspection of the card, person and photograph, stand-alone verification, which reads the
stored information on the card and on-line verification, which will allow the person and
card to be compared to the information stored on the central database").
211. Pamela Whit, National Identity System Faces Technical Challenges, Bus. DAY, Dec.
7, 1999, 1999 WL 25958756 [hereinafter Whit, National Identity System] (noting that
the proposed identification system would be the largest "civilian automated fingerprint
identification system... in the world"); Pamela Whit, Smart-card Decision Causes Con-
sternation in Industry Circles, Bus. DAY, Aug. 23, 1999, 1999 WL 22792247 [hereinafter
Whit, Smart-card Decision] (remarking that the smart card proposal would be a "massive
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mation on smart cards. 212
Due to the lack of technological infrastructure, the smart cards
presented a cost-effective solution for providing government services and
benefits. 2 13 Government officials in remote regions would not need con-
nections to networked databases because identity verification and relevant
information about a citizen could be accessed using an independent smart
card reader.2 14 To maintain the integrity of the information, the smart
cards would be synchronized with an extensive database that contained
essential information about the citizen, including fingerprints. 2 15 The
Director-General of the Department of Home Affairs would retain complete
control over the information stored in the centralized database.2 16
The government expects that the smart card will be used by both pub-
lic and private entities with the centralized database compiling an entire
file of the individual's personal information.2 17 Possible applications for
the smart card include uses in "housing, schools, hospitals, and even jobs"
with vital information ranging from birth and marriage to financial and
medical. 2 18 One common example of the potential for cross-over uses
between the public and private sectors involves collection of pension bene-
fits. 2 19 As conceived, a citizen could synchronize the smart card with a
government database to download that citizen's benefits on to the smart
and expensive undertaking, but could be a world first" due to the scope of the uses
proposed).
212. Shapshak, supra note 205 (detailing potential storage of information for driver's
license, bank accounts, health records, and security clearances); Whit, Smart-card Deci-
sion, supra note 211 (stating that government officials for "health, welfare, labour[,]
housing, justice, the SA Police Service and the State Information Technology Agency"
were interested in uses for the smart card).
213. Whit, Smart-card Decision, supra note 211 ("Since smart cards can operate
offline, they have the ability to overcome some of the barriers ... such as the lack of
infrastructure in SA's rural areas.").
214. Id.; Whitby, supra note 205 ("All a government official would require is a smart
card reader.").
215. Supra note 208; see also §§ 8, 14 of Identification Act 68 of 1997 (BSRSA).
216. §§ 6, 21 of Identification Act 68 of 1997; see also Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Min-
ister of Home Affairs, Media Briefing (Sept. 10, 1997) (transcript available at Unwembi's
Resource of South African Government Information, at http://www.polity.org.za/
govdocs/speeches/1997/sp0910.html) (describing the Identification Act of 1997 as
allowing the Minister to permit "restricted access to the Population Register ... at the
same time ensuring that the privacy of individuals... is being protected").
217. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Minister of Home Affairs, Media Briefing (Aug. 31,
1999) (transcript available at Unwembi's Resource of South African Government Infor-
mation, at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/speeches/1999/spO831b.html) (noting
considerations to "provide [South Africa's] citizens with a more versatile form of identifi-
cation, which they can use in their dealings with other organs of the state, and even for
private uses"). On a much more local scale, communities in the United Kingdom are
currently considering smart cards for interactive government services. BBC News, supra
note 184.
218. Dispatch Online, Editorial Opinion: Hanis, Afis, Saps & Sars (Feb. 16, 2001), at
http://www.dispatch.co.za/2001/02/16/editoria/aleader.htm; see also Dispatch Online,
Cabinet Yes for Smart Card Expected Soon (Feb. 13, 2001), at http://www.dispatch.co.za/
2001/02/13/southafrica/parlysma.htm.
219. E.g., Shapshak, supra note 205.
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card.220 Once downloaded, the citizen could use the smart card as a debit
or ATM card to purchase goods or withdraw money.221 So characterized,
South Africa's smart card presents a form of highly centralized information
management. 222
2. Privacy Enforcement
With a strongly centralized form of information management, an equally
strong form of privacy protection would mitigate the danger of disclosing
unnecessary personal information. South Africa, however, splinters pri-
vacy enforcement responsibility into four groups: the individual citizen,
Director-General of Home Affairs, Human Rights Commission, and Public
Protector. In general, individual citizens act for the single purpose of pro-
tecting their privacy and may seek enforcement in the courts.223
In contrast, each government organization with responsibility for citi-
zens' privacy only weighs the obligation as a minor factor in the balance of
the agency's primary duty. The Director-General of Home Affairs' duty to
implement the national identification system and Population Register
entails consideration of citizens' privacy in the information collected.224
Given the Department of Home Affairs' explicit open-ended discretion and
the continuing expansion of potential uses for the smart card, however, the
Director-General displays little commitment to data privacy. 225
The Human Rights Commission functions as the protector of funda-
mental rights enumerated in the constitution. 226 Within those duties, the
Human Rights Commission has the authority to pursue violations of pri-
vacy and human dignity, but also has the responsibility to monitor
infringements of divergent concerns such as access to courts, political
rights, education, and social security. 227 Consequently, even if the consti-
tution explicitly recognized a right to data privacy,2 28 the Human Rights
Commission could not and does not devote significant resources to protect-
ing citizens' privacy. 22 9
220. Id. (describing a system of government kiosks that provide services and govern-
ment information keyed to the smart card, such as pension benefits); supra note 210
(noting links to a centralized database).
221. E.g., Buthelezi, supra note 217.
222. Whit, National Identity System, supra note 211 ("'Instead of each department
issuing a separate card there will now be one multipurpose card and one infrastruc-
ture . . .' says [Home Affairs Chief Director of Information Technology, Patrick]
Monyeki.").
223. E.g., Mistry v. Interim Nat'l Med. and Dental Council of S. Mr., 1998 (7) BCLR
880 (CC) (describing an individual seeking protection under the constitutional right to
privacy).
224. Supra note 216 and accompanying text.
225. Supra notes 212, 216-18 and accompanying text.
226. South African Human Rights Comm., SAHRC - Profile (last visited Feb. 13,
2000), at http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc/profile/profile.html; see also S. Aii. CONST. ch.
2.
227. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2.
228. Supra note 207.
229. South African Human Rights Comm., SAHRC - Standing Committees (last visited
Feb. 13, 2000), at http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc/committees/committees.html
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The Public Protector acts as an independent investigator for com-
plaints against government officials.230 While this mandate could include
allegations of privacy violations, the Public Protector focuses on com-
plaints of government corruption, wasteful administration, and improper
conduct.2 3 1 Therefore, South Africa applies a decentralized system of pri-
vacy enforcement, splintering responsibility for privacy protections among
several agencies that have other significant obligations.
3. Citizens' Access to Information
After slight examination, the smart card epitomizes the ideal for centralized
citizen access to information. Using the smart card to compile personal
information, the citizen will always carry a copy of any relevant govern-
ment and corporate information.2 32 However, centralized access requires
that the citizen retains the rights to read the information stored on the
smart card and correct or dispute any erroneous information.23 3
The preliminary groundwork for these rights rests on the Promotion of
Access to Information Act (Information Act).2 3 4 The Information Act per-
mits citizens to request information from public and private organiza-
tions.235 If the citizen complies with procedural requirements, their right
to access government databases extends to all information held in the
databases-subject to specific exceptions, including exemptions to protect
third-party privacy or confidentiality, public safety and national security,
and economic stability.2 36 For access to private databases, the citizen
must seek the information in furtherance of the exercise or protection of
the citizen's rights, subject to exceptions similar to those affecting access to
government information.2 37 The additional requirement for private
databases, however, does not hinder citizens' access because personal data
qualifies explicitly as information necessary for the furtherance of the citi-
(describing the purpose and scope of the Commission's standing committees); South
African Human Rights Comm., SAHRC - Projects (last visited Feb. 13, 2000), at http://
www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc/projects/projects.html (reporting on the purpose and progress
of the Commission's existing projects); see also Streek, supra note 207 (explaining the
role of the Human Rights Commission in enforcing the Promotion of Access to Informa-
tion Act, §§ 83-85 of Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (BSRSA), and
noting the funding and resource difficulties that could hinder the Commission's
compliance).
230. Office of the Public Protector, The Public Protector (last visited Feb. 13, 2000), at
http://wwv.polity.org.za/govt/pubprot/pubprot.html.
231. Id.
232. Supra notes 212, 217-18 and accompanying text.
233. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1999)); Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, §§ 7, 14 (Eng.); cf.
Schwartz, supra note 70, at 595 ("The critical individual rights concern access to per-
sonal records and the opportunity to request their amendment.").
234. §§ 11-73, 88 of Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (BSRSA)
(enacted to execute the constitutional right to access, S. Ai'. CONST. ch. 2, § 32; Pream-
ble of Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000).
235. Id.
236. Id. §§ 11-49.
237. Id. §§ 50-73.
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zen's rights. 238 The Information Act effectively combines and expands the
rights to access conferred on U.S. citizens by the Freedom of Information
Act and Privacy Act.23 9
Even with access to information, citizens must be able to correct erro-
neous data.240 The Information Act takes a preliminary step by requiring
that government and private entities process citizens' requests for correc-
tions of information.241 However, the Information Act only commands
organizations to institute an internal process for handling corrections as a
interim measure until Parliament enacts legislation providing citizens spe-
cific procedural rights.242 With these rights, South Africa's citizens could
easily use the smart card to download, browse, and correct personal infor-
mation maintained on government and private databases.243 This poten-
tial approach presents a highly centralized form of citizens' access to
information.
III. Method for Formulating a Structural Solution: Definitions and
Premises
As privacy debates flare in response to new technology, 24 4 two premises
should be established: (1) substantial changes in the distribution of infor-
mation require structural modifications to information control and (2) as
238. Id. § 50(3); cf. id. § 1 (defining personal information).
239. Compare id. (granting access to government and privately held personal informa-
tion), with Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1999)) (government-held information), and Privacy
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(d) (1999)) (government-held personal information).
240. E.g., supra note 197 and accompanying text.
241. § 88 of Protection of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.
242. Id.
243. Id. § 18, 29, 53 (allowing electronic submission of requests for access and per-
mitting access in electronic form or as otherwise requested by the citizen); see also Shap-
shak, supra note 205 (describing government kiosks for downloading information);
Whitby, supra note 205 (noting the existence of portable smart card readers for brows-
ing information). While the Information Act prescribes a set form for information
requests, the smart card could be programmed to properly configure a citizen's request
and automatically submit the request electronically upon completion. The European
Commission recently subsidized research into technology to protect individual privacy
during electronic requests for information. Press Release, Privacy Incorporate Software
Agent, Fast and Safe Internet Work with PISA (Jan. 17, 2001), available at http://
www.tno.nl/instit/fel/pisa/press release start pisaj17012001.html.
244. E.g., Robert Lemos, ZDNet, Rights Groups Call for ID Tracking Laws (Mar. 9,
1999), at http://www.zdnet.com/pcweek/stories/news/O,4153,2222299,00.html (re-
counting privacy debate over Microsoft's collection of information during online regis-
tration despite lack of consumer consent and Intel's use of computer chips that silently
broadcast individualized identification numbers over the Internet); Courtney Macavinta,
CNET, Privacy Fears Raised by DoubleClick Database Plans Uan. 25, 2000), at http://
news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1531929.html (discussing privacy concerns provoked
by the merger of online advertiser, DoubleClick, with catalog merchant, Abacus Alli-
ance); ZDNet, RealNetworks is Watching You (Nov. 1, 1999), at http://www.zdnet.com/
zdnn/stories/news/,4586,2385034,00.html?chkptzdnntop (recounting privacy debate
over background collection of music downloaded from the Internet using company's
software).
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technology creates problems, technology holds the means to solving those
problems. An explanation of these premises provides perspective for
understanding the nature of the solution this Note seeks. With the proper
perspective, analysis of the United Kingdom and South Africa models pro-
vides principles upon which to base a solution for the United States.
A. Rights vs. Structure
The first premise acknowledges the way technology pervades our soci-
ety.245 Convenience for consumers, businesses, and government agencies
contributes to the expansion of increasingly invasive technology into all
aspects of everyday life.24 6 For example, as society moves from cash to
electronic payments, such as credit cards, a purchase trail materializes that
does not rely on receipts or human memory.247 Did Barry uses his credit
card to purchase something from Texaco two months ago for five dollars?
Most likely, Barry discarded any paper receipt of the purchase and does
not remember details. On the other hand, the credit card company
recorded the seller's name, location, date, time, and amount of the
purchase. 248  Theoretically, this information could be stored
indefinitely.249
The credit card company's collection serves legitimate goals of admin-
istrative efficiency, 250 consumer protection, and liability avoidance. Stor-
ing the information enables the company to comply efficiently with a Fair
Credit Billing Act provision governing prompt response to billing dis-
putes 251 and a Truth in Lending section limiting cardholder liability to fifty
dollars for fraudulent use of the card.25 2 Thus, the cardholder benefits
from the consumer protection provisions and efficient service.
The lure of convenience, however, ingratiates technology into daily
life. The need for advanced services permits the slow erosion of mundane
anonymity.253 In many facets of modern life, such as grocery purchases
and home telephone calls, activities once believed private only because
considered trivial or insignificant are tracked and stored by the firms pro-
viding the underlying service.254 In many cases, individuals must tolerate
245. E.g., Grossman, supra note 14, at 1010-13.
246. Supra notes 13, 15 and accompanying text.
247. Swire, supra note 13, at 464-67.
248. Id. at 465.
249. Although current storage media, such as computer hard drives, only last about
ten years, the capability of transferring data to new media means data could be stored
indefinitely. See generally M. Halem et al., Earth & Space Data Computing Division,
NASA, Technology Assessment of High Capacity Data Storage Systems: Can We Avoid a Data
Survivability Crisis? (Feb. 2, 1999), at http://sdcd.gsfc.nasa.gov/ESDCD/
wvhitepaper.datasurvive.html (describing the need for a policy to maintain constant
data migration to newv media to preserve indefinitely the mass of historical documents
stored on aging media).
250. Supra note 13 and accompanying text.
251. Pub. L. No. 93-495 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1999)).
252. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1126 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1643(a)(1)(B) (1999)).
253. Swire, supra note 13, at 464.
254. Id.
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this invasive collection of information or forego the service,255 leading
some to conclude that an expectation of privacy is the sacrificial lamb of
modernization. 256
1. Rights-Based Privacy
The struggle between privacy and technology arises from a failure of tradi-
tional notions of rights-based privacy to recognize the structural inequity
formed in an era where a single piece of information represents power
beyond that revealed by examining the information in isolation.2 57 In gen-
eral, the U.S. government grants individuals rights for the purpose of pro-
moting individual autonomy and empowering them as active participants
in society.258 The United States protects freedom of speech, prohibits
unauthorized searches, and bars cruel and unusual punishment in part to
encourage citizens by leveling inequitable power distribution between indi-
viduals and government agencies or corporate firms.25 9 For example, the
255. Supra notes 53-56, 154 and accompanying text.
256. Grossman, supra note 14, at 1013; CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY, supra note 14, at
70.
257. Compare supra Part I.B.2.a.ii, b.ii (describing the rise of U.S. informational pri-
vacy and subsequent failure of courts to uniformly protect individuals against govern-
ment disclosure or use of social security numbers capable of revealing detailed personal
information), with Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, No. 85-3449, 1993 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 286, at *11-24 (Mass. Super. Ct.June 8, 1993) (recognizing the aggregating power
of information, but declining to apply a right to privacy to restrict access to any informa-
tion, including social security numbers), with supra Part L.A (noting the intrinsic risk in
networked databases of enabling detailed retrieval of personal data when an individual
only discloses a national identification number or trivial personal information).
258. The constitutional right of free expression is ... designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in
the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citi-
zenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see also 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 108 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds., 1774) ("The importance of [freedom of
the press] consists ... in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequent-
ial promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimi-
dated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs."), quoted in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss
the possibility of conflicts between rights, such as between free speech and privacy.
E.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3789
(U.S. June 26, 2000) (No. 99-1687); SOLEVIG SINGLETON, PRIVACY AS CENSORSHIP: A SKEPTI.
CAL VIEW OF PROPOSALS TO REGULATE PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Cato Inst., Policy
Analysis No. 295, 1998); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1049 (2000). Regulation of collected personal data may not, however, implicate First
Amendment concerns. E.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, No. 00-1141, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6241 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 13, 2001) (denying a First Amendment claim asserted for
personal information that the FTC claimed was subject to the Fair Credit Reporting
Act-imposing privacy regulations on consumer reporting agencies).
259. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY THE TRUE ORIGINAL
ExTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Robert Maynard Hutchings et al. eds., 1952)
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right to equal protection of the laws empowered African-American citizens
to expand their participation in society through the diverse aspects of the
Civil Rights Movement, including the integration of schools and increased
involvement in national political debate.260
While the rights-based model of governance laudably equalizes citi-
zens, the privacy right's scope has stagnated in the United States.261 The
Supreme Court justified this stagnation by explaining that "the guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and
open-ended. '262 This response begs the question because the Court for-
mulated the original categories of fundamental rights without explicit gui-
dance.263 Accordingly, the Court's justification only hinders the progress
of fundamental rights analysis at an arbitrary and incomplete stage of
development. This stagnation may arguably be justified, however, under
the assumption that citizens retain sufficient protections to secure their
individual autonomy. 264
Yet, a rights-based model cannot remain stagnant during a period of
rapid technological advancement. In the last forty years, the power of infor-
mation has increased exponentially. Previously, information only wielded
power if sufficiently intimate or personal. For example, in the 1960s, the
average person with a only a phone number could not use that information
for any purpose other than to call the individual to whom the number
belonged. Now, the same person with only a phone number could retrieve
a name and address with minimal effort over the Internet.265 With the
name, address, and phone number, the person holds sufficient informa-
tion to retrieve further data from government agencies, such as public
(1690) (describing the power inequities between the government and individuals caused
by citizens' relinquishing power upon entering society for the benefit of the govern-
ment's protecting the citizens' life, liberty, and property); see also Shapiro, supra note 34
(noting the unequal bargaining position of individuals and marketing companies as a
problem with self-regulation). Locke's essays influenced the framing of the U.S. Consti-
tution. United States v. Ganz, 806 F. Supp. 1567, 1575 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("The consent
theory of government, expounded by philosophers such as John Locke... and adopted
by our founding fathers, supports the concept of a government entrusted by the people
with carrying on the affairs common to us all."); Encyclopadia Britannica, John Locke:
Political Theory (last visited Feb. 18, 2000), at http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/
article/1/0,5716,114881+12+108465,00.html ("Locke formulated the classic expression
of liberalism, which was to inspire both the shapers of the American Revolution and the
authors of the U.S. Constitution.").
260. WINI BREINES, COMMUNITY AND ORGANIZATION IN THE Naxv LEFT: 1962-1968 21-23
(1982).
261. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (expressing a
reluctance to expand the categories of fundamental substantive rights); see also supra
note 130 and accompanying text.
262. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125.
263. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (articulating a right to pri-
vacy from implicit principles in the Constitution and cultural history); see also supra
notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
264. E.g., Bibas, supra note 23 (advocating contractual solutions to privacy concerns).
265. Supra note 22 (discussing reverse search technology).
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records and criminal history.266 Therefore, with each piece of information
provided to the government or private firms, the individual yields signifi-
cant power to that entity. 267 This dangerous redistribution of power poses
a greater threat as organizations realize the rights-based model does not
respect a strong right to information control, prompting collection of infor-
mation without the informed consent of citizens.268
Unfortunately, the risk in stressing the power of information is a back-
lash against information collection and data services. Yet often, as the
example with Barry's credit card illustrates, the collection and dissemina-
tion of information is not necessarily malicious. 269 Progress entails infor-
mation exchange and storage as citizens seek services and must relinquish
personal information, 270 but it does not necessitate a lessened expectation
of privacy.2 7 1 The judiciary, however, has not been able to formulate a
266. E.g., Living in the Global Goldfish Bowl, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1999, LEXIS, News
Library, ECON File (following the efforts of a private investigator and "blagger"-a per-
son that collects minimal personal information about another individual then poses as
that person-to obtain more detailed information about the author).
267. E.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 765 (1989) ("[Tlhese statutes and regulations ... evidence a congres-
sional ... recognition of the power of compilations to affect personal privacy that out-
strips the combined power of the bits of information contained within.").
268. E.g., Ed Bott, How Progress Killed Privacy, SMART BUSINESs, Mar. 2000, available at
http://www.zdnet.com/smartbusinessmag/stories/all/0,6605,2429470-2,00.html ("The
incentives just aren't there for the industry to provide meaningful privacy rights to con-
sumers." (quoting David Sobel, General Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information
Center)); Sovern, supra note 16, at 1074-90 ("As a result, as long as marketers have the
power and incentive to inflate strategic transaction costs, the market is unlikely to pro-
duce an efficient equilibrium.") (describing the methods and motivation of businesses
to make it difficult for consumers to protect personal information); see also Junkbusters,
How Web Servers' Cookies Threaten Your Privacy (last visited Feb. 18, 2000), at http://
www.junkbusters.com/ht/en/cookies.html (describing the information collected with-
out an individual's knowledge when Internet servers use cookies and setting steps to
disable the cookies functionality, which allows people to assert their right to privacy but
at the cost of cookies' convenience); Michigan Attorney General Granholm Files Action
Against DoubleClick Over Privacy Issues, PR NEwswi,, Feb. 17, 2000. Westlaw,
ALLNEWSPLUS File (reporting that the Michigan Attorney General initiated legal action
against Doubleclick for using Internet cookies to track consumers' personal information
without consent). The reality of these concerns has manifested during bankruptcy pro-
ceedings of Internet companies that sought to sell databases of personal information
collected from users. Heather Green, Your Right to Privacy: Going ... Going. . ., Bus.
Wk., Apr. 23, 2001, at 48, LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (describing the bank-
ruptcy efforts of Toysmart.com and Voter.com to sell databases of 250,000 and 170,000
users respectively and explaining that many companies are unilaterally changing their
privacy policies for consumer information to avoid FTC scrutiny of similar sales)
("[C]ustomers can do little to stop [online companies] from selling information thought
to be confidential."); cf. Press Release, TRUSTe, TRUSTe Seeks Public Comment on Pri-
vacy Guidelines for Companies Undergoing Mergers, Acquisitions and Bankruptcies
(Apr. 11, 2001), available at http://www.truste.org/about/aboutmabs.html (proposing
self-regulation guidelines for corporate transfer of personal information databases in
bankruptcy contexts).
269. Supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
270. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1332-34; see also Grossman, supra note 14, at 1013.
271. Infra Part IV.A.3 (balancing interests in privacy and convenience to formulate a
structural solution to privacy issues raised by data storage and sharing).
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strong right to information privacy due to stagnation in the rights-based
model and a failure to recognize the power of information.
2. Structural Approach: Something Different
Consequently, the solution requires a structural approach that reorganizes
the distribution of power over personal information between government
and corporate entities and individuals. 272 Before proceeding, we must
develop the concept of a structural approach.273 The basis for the term
rests on the image of a building foundation. A building's foundation estab-
lishes its dimensions at a basic, committed level. It provides the stepping
stone for any of numerous potential edifices, but once completed, it also
permanently excludes a subset of possible structures. Consider the foun-
dation for a single story residence. The foundation could be laid knowing
only the planned dimensions of the home-a point in development where
questions about doors and windows are irrelevant. The foundation reveals
the limits, and an observer could reasonably conclude that building will
not be a skyscraper.
Transposing this analogy on the current analysis, certain features of a
structural approach are evident. The approach operates using broad gener-
alizations that facilitate a singular purpose-for example, the analogy's
purp9se to build a place to live. Furthermore, the approach seeks to create
physical barriers that block some purposes-for example, the impossibility
of constructing a high-rise on the foundation for a hovel. For information
control, the structural principles seek to organize information systems so
that physical impediments reduce the feasibility of unfettered government
or corporate control over citizens' personal information and ensure data
privacy for any resultant system.
Since the structural approach assumes such an abstract perspective
and operates from blatant policy choices, 274 the solution would necessa-
rily be legislative rather than judicial.275 While a rights-based model may
be one means to comply with the structural principles, the details of any
272. But cf. Bibas, supra note 23 (proposing an approach requiring personal informa-
tion contracts between individuals and data collectors). Given the inequitable power
distribution between individuals and data collection groups, supra notes 266-68 and
accompanying text; see also Sovern, supra note 16, at 1090-91, 1112 (advocating an opt-
in contract with data collectors and noting that it would not significantly reduce the
information industry because consumers lack the resources to deal with these matters
and marketers have a strong incentive and the resources to convince consumers to opt-
in), Bibas's more rights-based approach fails to actually provide individuals substantive
protection.
273. See generally RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (justifying principles for politi-
cal systems by the principles' structural consequences that ensure fairness for the sys-
tem's procedures).
274. E.g., infra Part V.A.3 (weighing the value of interests in privacy and convenience
to formulate a principle of information management).
275. Cf. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("[S]ince a wide variety of classifi-
cations must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances,
such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or
the Executive than to the Judiciary.") (ruling on a standard of review for Congress's
social security requirements for resident aliens).
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final method of compliance would be irrelevant in considering the underly-
ing principles,2 76 similar to the windows and doors in the home analogy.
A structural solution should reorient information systems in a way that the
solution's underlying principles function as operating facts. In other
words, if an information system exists, it complies with the solution's prin-
ciples because to do otherwise would not be physically, socially, or eco-
nomically feasible.277
For a concrete example at a lower level of abstraction, consider traffic
rules, specifically rules regarding traffic lanes. On a two-lane road with
traffic traveling in both directions, cars on either side drive in opposite
directions. All drivers accept this rule as a pure operating fact because
travel in the other lane would not be feasible. This conclusion does not
mean that traveling in the other lane would be impossible. The driver
could easily pull into the other lane. However, due to the presence of other
vehicles, honking admonishments from fellow travelers, or concern for
damaging the car, the driver foregoes the option because it would not be
physically, socially, or economically feasible.
B. Technology as a Tool
Furthermore, to formulate a structural solution for information control,
the solution must respect technology. The second premise recognizes that
the risks to privacy from networked databases stem from technological
advancement. 278 The risks, however, should not inspire Neo-Luddites or
instigate a retreat to technologically-bereft woods.279 Technology must be
acknowledged as a tool, with its products shaped by the purpose for which
they were created. A structural solution should use technology to fashion
results with an underlying concern for privacy.
Traditional methods of avoidance to maintain anonymity will not suf-
276. Cf. RAwLs, supra note 273 (arguing that the principles of fairness do not necessi-
tate any specific form of compliance).
277. This Note does not explore the technological feasibility of systems. Accordingly,
highly sophisticated technological proposals are not explored. Also, software impedi-
ments that increase privacy and security measures that preserve the integrity of data are
not considered as aspects of the structural solution. For a starting point on these topics,
see Ctr. for Educ. & Research in Info. Assurance & Sec., Network Security (last visited
Feb. 18, 2000), at http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/coast/hotlist/network (linking numer-
ous resources regarding types of security available for information and databases shared
over a network); Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr., EPIC Online Guide to Practical Privacy
Tools (last visited Feb. 18, 2000), at http://epic.org/privacy/tools.html (listing software
available to protect data shared through diverse network services, such as e-mail and
webpages); RSA Security, RSA Laboratories' Frequently Asked Questions About Today's
Cryptography (last visited Feb. 18, 2000), at http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faq/
index.html (providing educational information on the methods of encryption and
authentication available to protect personal privacy).
278. Supra Part I.A.
279. Nancy Allen, Ludditism Today (last visited Feb. 18, 2000), at http://pub-
lish.uwo.ca/-nallenl/nlud.htm (describing the Neo-Luddites as opposed to technology
that deprives individuals of their humanity and using the Unabomber, Theodore
Kaczynski, as an example).
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fice in modern society.2 80 Only technological solutions can balance inter-
ests in convenience and privacy while staying current with the fast-paced
innovations for data usage. Yesterday, it was index card fles;28 ' today, the
Internet and networks;282 tomorrow, perhaps biometric scanners.
283
Therefore, any analysis must explore the possibility that given an impetus
and direction to protect privacy, technology could contribute to the overall
solution.
IV. Structuring Information Control
Proceeding with a mandate to formulate a structural solution with techno-
logical components, the national identification number models from the
United Kingdom and South Africa set a useful comparative scale for evalu-
ating principles of information control. The following analysis employs the
same organization used when the models were introduced, examining the
privacy implications for each country's treatment of information manage-
ment, privacy enforcement, and citizens' access to information. After for-
mulating a solution and explaining how the resulting principles operate,
we can evaluate the potential impact on the United States.
A. Information Management
The United States uses a system of information management characterized
by a decentralized network of databases with weak access and privacy
restrictions. 284 Due to the weak restrictions, the system approximates a
more centralized database.2 85 While there is no means available to search
the entire network as if it were a single database, easy access allows organi-
zations to collate records with minimal effort, especially since the privacy
protections are inadequate to limit the use of social security numbers as
identification numbers.2 86 This U.S. system developed by balancing the
interests in convenience and privacy. 2 87 An appropriate solution must
continue to recognize the need for balance, even though the interests advo-
cate solutions in diametric opposition to each other.
280. Swire, supra note 13, at 473-74 (describing the harsh chilling effect of financial
surveillance on citizens' activities as individuals attempt to minimize exposure to scru-
tiny by avoiding traceable transactions); see also supra notes 54-56.
281. Supra note 177 and accompanying text.
282. Supra Part I.A.
283. E.g., David E. Kalish, Eye Scans and Palm Readings Might Become ID of the Future,
OREGONIAN, July 27, 1997, 1997 WL 4193534. See generally Woodward, supra note 31.
284. Compare supra Part II (defining decentralized information management as sepa-
rate locations or restricted access), with supra Part L.A (describing the basic technological
underpinnings of the U.S. database network), and supra Part I.B.2. (exploring what enti-
ties have access to social security numbers in the United States).
285. Id.; supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
286. Id.; supra Part I.B.2.b.i, ii.
287. Supra Part I (explaining the interests in efficiency and privacy that motivate the
U.S. debate about social security numbers).
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1. Privacy
Due to excessive release of personal information from a centralized
database, 288 privacy interests require a solution that uses decentralized
information management. A decentralized system provides physical
impediments to data access. 28 9 Each organization must specifically collect
the information stored on its database. 290 The collection process may
entail direct requests addressed to the individual or indirect requests
addressed to other organizations. 29 1 Either method provides stronger
intrinsic privacy protection than a centralized database. Direct requests
empower the individual by permitting control over the flow of information
to different sources. 29 2 Indirect requests harbor a potential for protection
due to bureaucratic obstacles that block rampant collection of personal
information. 2 93 Whether or not the organization holding the data may be
lenient in distributing the information to others, the mere necessity of ask-
ing permission imposes an impediment because it requires another person
to analyze the legitimacy of information requests. 29 4 Therefore, interests
in privacy press toward a decentralized system.
The United Kingdom uses a database network similar to the United
States, but the network differs significantly with regard to access restric-
tions.29 5 Without a national identification number, collating information
between the different databases presents a substantial challenge. 29 6 Fur-
thermore, government and corporate entities must satisfy the Information
Commissioner that they have a legitimate purpose for collecting the infor-
mation and sufficient privacy protections to secure the data from improper
use.29 7 These additional facets of the United Kingdom's model differenti-
ate it from the U.S. system and impose barriers between databases that
make the result truly decentralized. 298
288. Supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (describing concerns raised in the
U.S. privacy debates); see also supra note 189 (listing the Data Protection Principles
enforced in the U.K.)
289. E.g., supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
290. E.g., supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
291. E.g., supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
292. Supra Part III.A.1.b (discussing the power of information and noting the struggle
of individuals for control over the flow of that information).
293. E.g., supra text accompanying note 13 (contrasting the difficulties of collating
information by hand with the ease of database queries); cf. supra note 18 and accompa-
nying text (listing the elimination of bureaucratic impediments to information collection
as a risk of national identification numbers).
294. E.g., supra Part II.A.2. Depending on the reviewing agency or firm, the legiti-
macy analysis would involve diverse factors that may not include privacy interests.
295. Compare supra note 284 and accompanying text, with supra notes 179-84
(describing a decentralized database system with practical access restricted between sep-
arate databases because of incompatible information storage).
296. Supra notes 37, 294 and accompanying text.
297. Supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
298. Compare supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text, with supra notes 181-84
and accompanying text.
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In contrast, if characterized as a highly centralized and unrestricted
system of information management, South Africa's model would only pre-
sent a straw-man proposal, felled easily in the interests of privacy.
2 9 9
Although that characterization would be premature, a proper categoriza-
tion of the system is difficult because South Africa has not finalized and
implemented the model. 300 Accordingly, in discussing unknown or ill-
defined features, this Note extrapolates to fill gaps. In so doing, two
aspects in combination indicate strong access restrictions to the centralized
database. 30 1
The centralized facet of South Africa's model hinges on the collection
of all information through smart cards synchronized with a single
database. 30 2 The government's primary purpose for the smart card, how-
ever, is to provide a method of verifying identity and personal informa-
tion.30 3 At least according to preliminary understandings, while
government and corporate groups may maintain separate databases, the
centralized database will only be used for identity verification.30 4 It would
be inconsistent to allow verification inquiries when the individual to be
identified is not present; government and corporate entities would not be
able to query the database without the smart card, the key to authenticat-
ing identity. Even with the smart card, entities could only verify informa-
tion.30 5 Therefore, citizens retain strong control over the flow of personal
information because they possess the key to accessing the database and
requests for information would not reveal excess data.
However, South Africa's system should still be considered centralized.
The mere existence of the single database used for verification poses a sig-
nificant risk of "mission creep."30 6 For example, enacting one exception to
privacy protections for law enforcement to track criminals may lead to
another exception for tax agents to trace spending habits. Eventually, the
299. Supra notes 288-94 and accompanying text.
300. Lesley Stones, Smart Cards to Replace ID Books in SA in 2001, Bus. DAY, (S. Afr.)
Feb. 1, 2000, 2000 WL 7450599 (indicating that the smart cards should be issued to
citizens in the second half of 2001, but noting the history of changes to the proposal
since first considered); see also supra 191-95 and accompanying text.
301. Cf. supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text (stressing, in the context of the
U.S. system, the importance of strong access restrictions to a model focused on privacy
protection).
302. Supra notes 206-12, 215-18, 222 and accompanying text.
303. Supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
304. Supra note 210.
305. E.g., Dep't of Home Affairs, supra note 208 (describing the centralized database
as a basis for comparison, which implies that government and corporate entities must
already possess personal data to compare with the central database). This conclusion
may be wishful thinking if technical issues make it impractical to limit queries compared
to an alternative that releases a full record for the requesting agency to spend resources
parsing. E.g., Oracle, Database Limits (last visited Feb. 18, 2000), at http://
oradoc.photo.net/ora8l/DOC/server.815/a67790/ch4.htm (describing the different
types of limits on Oracle database use, including limits on the number of queries that
can be processed simultaneously). However, the privacy implications of releasing a full
record make South Africa's model wholly unappealing. Supra note 299 and accompany-
ing text.
306. Supra notes 35, 51-52 and accompanying text.
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exempted uses outnumber the restricted uses. 30 7 Therefore, South Africa's
model raises inherent difficulties for privacy interests.
2. Convenience
In contrast to privacy interests, interests in convenience press for a central-
ized method of information management because of the greater effi-
ciency. 308 With data stored in a single location or networked in a system
of unrestricted access, a centralized database maximizes convenience. 309
Centralized data eliminates bureaucratic restrictions on access to files from
other organizations 310 and redundancy in filing, which risks inaccurate or
outdated information, 311 but retains the benefit of readily retrievable
data.312
On this account, the United Kingdom's model fails miserably. The
relative anonymity enjoyed by British citizens comes at the price of ram-
pant inefficiency in government services.313 Redundant collections of
information and copious identification cards and numbers prevail. 314 The
inefficiency and inconvenience of the system has even triggered a reaction
from the U.K.'s government to rectify the situation.315 An abundance of
databases without any simple means of linking the stored information is
not conducive to convenience.316
On the other hand, South Africa's model preserves the convenience of
data storage and sharing. With access to a citizen's smart card, a govern-
ment or corporate organization can verify the accuracy of information sup-
plied by the individual or other sources.317 The information would then
be stored on separate databases and used confidently to process services
307. E.g., supra Part I.B (discussing the steady expansion of uses for the social secur-
ity number beyond tracking citizens qualified for benefits).
308. E.g., MODERNISING GovERNMENT, supra note 182, ch. 4, 5 (identifying inefficient
processes as contributing to dissatisfaction with inconvenient government services and
discussing steps to increase system efficiency that would have a corresponding positive
impact on convenience).
309. Supra note 161.
310. Supra notes 289-94 and accompanying text (noting that an organization must
contact either the citizen for information or seek another organization's permission for
data in a decentralized system).
311. E.g., NASA, GIS Business Plan (Feb. 16, 1995), at http://gis-www.larc.nasa.gov/
bplan/bplanO.html ("Another problem is that of redundant database development &
maintenance efforts .... Any changes must be entered in three different databases. The
information is updated with differing frequency and accuracy.") (conducting a cost-
benefit analysis for using Geographic Information Systems technology at Langley
Research Center); cf. supra notes 40, 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing the dan-
gers of reliance on separated databases generally).
312. Supra examples discussed at Part I.A.
313. Compare Engel, supra note 179 (describing the ability of British citizens under a
system without national identification cards to "disappear... and be challenged by no
one"), with supra note 183.
314. Supra notes 181, 183.
315. Supra note 184.
316. Compare supra note 184 and accompanying text, with supra note 161.
317. Supra notes 206-12, 220 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 303-05 and
accompanying text.
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for the individual. 318 Furthermore, while not part of any current proposal,
the citizen could grant an entity limited permission to access requisite data
for the purpose of updating files.3 19 While this model maintains certain
redundancies in the system, it minimizes the risks of inaccurate informa-
tion and simplifies the process for accessing data.320 Also, the model safe-
guards the convenience benefits to the individual by minimizing time
expended to request or receive services from government agencies or cor-
porate firms. 32 1
3. Balancing
Neither system presents a solution satisfactory for both privacy and conve-
nience interests.322 Yet, one area where the models converge is the empha-
sis on significant access restrictions, 323 which implicitly includes
regulation of both public and private data uses.3 24 While each country's
implementation differs, both impose procedures to protect their respective
database systems from unwarranted access and excessive exposure to per-
sonal information, features arguably lacking in the United States.325 This
aspect provides common ground from which to create a balanced system
between the United Kingdom and South Africa models.
318. This conclusion is an extrapolation from the smart card project as so far devel-
oped. Supra text accompanying note 300; see also analysis used in text accompanying
notes 304-05. It would be inefficient for corporate firms to not maintain their own
databases, if the government only allowed access to the centralized database for verifica-
tion purposes. Supra text accompanying note 304. However, even with redundant
databases, the firms could be assured accurate information by conducting regular verifi-
cation queries of the centralized database. Supra note 311 and accompanying text (rais-
ing concerns about redundant databases).
319. Given the need to possess the smart card in order to make inquiries of the cen-
tralized database, supra text accompanying notes 304-05, and the necessity of regular
verification queries to maintain accurate information, supra note 317, it would be an
inefficient process for the firm to constantly seek out the citizen to make the inquiry.
Accordingly, a revocable privilege granted by the citizen for the firm to make regular
inquiries possible without requiring the citizen's presence increases convenience.
320. Supra notes 214, 243 and accompanying text (describing smart card's easy
accessibility to stored data); supra note 318 (explaining methods for ensuring accurate
data).
321. Supra note 319.
322. Compare supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text (discussing the United King-
dom's success in furthering privacy interests), and supra notes 313-16 and accompany-
ing text (failure to satisfy convenience interests), with supra notes 299-302, 306-07 and
accompanying text (discussing South Africa's failure to satisfy privacy interests), and
supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text (success in furthering convenience interests).
323. Supra notes 295-98, 300-04.
324. Supra notes 185, 197-98, 216-18, 235-39 and accompanying text (indicating that
the United Kingdom and South Africa do not significantly distinguish public and private
data collection for purposes of privacy regulation). Strong access restrictions to data
necessitate regulation of government and corporate entities. Otherwise, the unregulated
private information market blossoms so that extensive databases of personal informa-
tion still exist, risking the same intrinsic dangers as large-scale, networked government
databases. See Simpson, supra note 16. The risks of massive personal information
databases inhere without regard to whether the data collector is a public or private
entity.
325. Compare supra notes 295-98, 301-04, with supra Part I.B.2.b.i.
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The risk of mission creep critically hinders the adoption of South
Africa's centralized database because it lacks a fundamental structural
obstacle to protect against significant privacy violations.326 Therefore, the
base model must be a decentralized system. Yet, as the United Kingdom's
model demonstrates, decentralized systems suffer from an equally fatal dis-
regard for technology as a tool.3 27 The effective bar on data exchange elim-
inates all benefits from technology, but nets a minimal privacy gain
because entities could still gather information manually.328 Thus, some
modification must be made to the United Kingdom's system to realize the
technological advantages.
South Africa's proposed model restricts access, in part, by only per-
mitting verification inquiries and update requests utilizing the central
database. 329 If so implemented, a database would not communicate any
new information when queried by government or corporate entities. 330
This process results in a system that furthers interests in using technology
to provide efficient and convenient services. 331 Additionally, those partic-
ular aspects of South Africa's model could be easily integrated into the
United Kingdom's decentralized database system. If the United Kingdom's
procedures for restricting access were relaxed in cases where an organiza-
tion only sought verification information, then the privacy protections
would be maintained without the resulting inconvenience.
While a decentralized database network imposes a physical impedi-
ment to potential privacy violations, the verification procedure only bal-
ances interests in privacy and convenience.332 As applied to the United
States, this facet of the ultimate solution would require the formulation of
significant access restrictions.333 It would also necessitate eliminating all
currently available exceptions and replacing them with a single exception
for verification requests. 334
B. Privacy Enforcement
While the analysis for information management demands a balancing of
interests between privacy and convenience, consideration of privacy
enforcement procedures and citizens' access to information only require
evaluation of the models in the interests of privacy. In the United States,
individuals motivate privacy enforcement.335 While the OMB and the Data
326. Supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
327. Supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
328. E.g., supra text accompanying note 21 (illustrating that databases facilitate data
collection but information would be available for collection manually even without
databases).
329. Supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text (extrapolating from the current
South Africa proposal to justify a model that uses verification only and allows for
update permission).
330. Supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text.
331. Supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text.
332. Supra Part IV.A.3.
333. Supra notes 323-25 and accompanying text.
334. Compare supra Part I.B.2.b.i, with supra notes 329-31 and accompanying text.
335. Cf. supra Part IIl.A (discussing the U.S. focus on individual rights).
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Integrity Boards mandated by the Privacy Act provide ineffective govern-
ment oversight,33 6 the United States has tended recently to rely on the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) to regulate corporate violations of privacy in
grave situations.33 7 Since the FTC only concentrates on critical privacy
issues, however, the agency does not provide a stable system of enforce-
ment. Thus, ultimate responsibility for privacy falls to a group of people
with radically diverse motives.3 38 In other words, the United States
employs a highly decentralized system of privacy enforcement.
In contrast to the reactive role of the U.S. judiciary in enforcing rights,
the U.K.'s Commissioner has an active role in validating the privacy protec-
tions employed by public and private organizations. 33 9 The Commissioner
critically analyzes proposed data usage for potential invasions of pri-
vacy.3 40 Furthermore, the Commissioner responds to any proposed sys-
tem of information management that could impact citizens' data
privacy.3 4 1
Although not to the extreme of the United States or United Kingdom,
South Africa splinters responsibility for privacy between several govern-
ment agencies. As a result, the agencies rarely give serious consideration
to the privacy implications associated with the collection of personal infor-
mation.3 42 Arguably, splitting responsibility for individual privacy into
several agencies safeguards privacy interests because multiple organiza-
tions may scrutinize uses of personal information for compliance with pri-
336. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 597-602 (explaining that the Data Integrity Boards
function only to police "housekeeping measures"-nonsubstantive provisions-in the
Privacy Act and that the OMB, to the detriment of privacy concerns, focuses on the
efficiency of computers to carry out its duties to "supervis[e] federal paperwork, debt
collection, and the reduction of the federal deficit").
337. Robert MacMillan, U.S.-Style Data Privacy Tastes Pretty Good, NEvsBYTES, Jan.
20, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, NWSBYT File; see also, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, FTC Sues Failed Website, Toysmart.com, for Deceptively Offering for Sale Per-
sonal Information of Website Visitors (July 10, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2000/07/toysmart.htm; Federal Trade Comm'n, Statement byJodie Bernstein, Direc-
tor, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 16, 2000), at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/02/dblclickstajb.htm (acknowledging an investigation into
Doubleclick's business practices after privacy complaints leveled at the company).
338. Compare, e.g., Baker v. Dep't of the Navy, 814 F.2d 1381, 1381-82 (9th Cir.
1987) (seeking to purge records through the Privacy Act, believing the files had a detri-
mental effect on her career), with Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 603 (9th Cir. 1984)
(seeking to avoid mandatory disclosure of social security number through the Privacy
Act because illegal alien believed that disclosure would ultimately result in deportation),
with Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1999) (seek-
ing to invoke the Privacy Act to avoid disclosing social security number to employer,
believing the number represented the Biblical "Mark of the Beast").
339. Supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
340. Supra notes 189-90, 193 and accompanying text.
341. E.g., Modernising Government Response, supra note 179 (commenting on the pri-
vacy implications of the proposal to change the United Kingdom's information manage-
ment, supra note 184).
342. Supra notes 224-25, 230-31 and accompanying text.
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vacy protections. 343 However, if governments splinter responsibility for
privacy enforcement, then the groups on whom the government places the
responsibility must necessarily have other duties and priorities;344 privacy
becomes merely another factor to consider.345 Further, since other agen-
cies also have a responsibility to protect privacy, any one group may mini-
mize its role in fulfilling that responsibility, reasoning that others will
correct any lapses. Inevitably, no agency effectively provides privacy
enforcement.
Accordingly, the United Kingdom's system of centralized privacy
enforcement provides a better model for structuring a U.S. solution. By
vesting authority in a single independent agency whose sole purpose
involves privacy protection, the structural solution establishes a massive
impediment to invasions of privacy. Government agencies and corporate
firms could no longer dominate unsophisticated citizens, who fear the vast
market and its exchange and use of personal information, 346 but cannot
obtain services elsewhere. 347 The risk of investigation, independently or
based on a complaint, increases the cost to government agencies and cor-
porate firms for noncompliance with privacy protections. 348 In the United
States, this solution would require the creation of a new government
agency responsible only for protecting citizens' privacy, a proposal consid-
ered in initial versions of the Privacy Act.3 49
C. Citizens' Access to Information
Turning to the models for citizens' access to information, the United States
has developed the most decentralized and restricted system for permitting
citizen access. Individuals may only query government databases 350 and
must submit a written request directly to each agency that collects personal
343. E.g., supra text accompanying note 294 (adding additional levels of scrutiny that
may hinder privacy invasions as a side-effect, although not suggesting that responsibility
for privacy interests be allocated to those additional levels).
344. E.g., supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text (describing the other duties of
those South Africa agencies charged to protect privacy).
345. E.g., supra notes 223-31 and accompanying text.
346. CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY, supra note 14, at 71 (noting that 94% of consumers
were "very" or "somewhat" concerned about the potential for misuse of personal infor-
mation); supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Encyclopedia Britannica, Infor-
mation Processing: Effects on the Economy (last visited Feb. 18, 2000), at http://
www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/7/0,5716,109287+1+106312,00.html ("Aware-
ness that possession of information is tantamount to a competitive edge is stimulating
the gathering of technical and economic intelligence at the corporate and national
levels.").
347. Supra notes 54-56, 154 and accompanying text.
348. Compare supra note 268 (noting that firms have no reason to protect privacy and
giving examples where firms have disregarded any concern for individual privacy), with
supra note 190 and accompanying text (describing the power of the Information Com-
missioner to pursue investigations and prosecute violations).
349. Schwartz, supra note 70, at 596 n.265.
350. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1999)) (government-held information); Privacy Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)
(1999)) (government-held personal information).
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information. 35 1 However, the need for access to personal information does
not end at government services.3 5 2 An inability to access, verify, update,
and delete records in private databases may equally infringe citizens' pri-
vacy. 35 3 In most aspects, the United Kingdom resembles the United
States.35 4
While South Africa uses a similar system of decentralized access
requests, 35 5 the model's intriguing aspect involves the smart card applica-
tions.3 56 Although the uses for the smart card are not finalized,3 5 7 it repre-
sents the ultimate device for collating personal information stored on
government and private databases.3 58 The smart card could be program-
med to provide an individual with full control over access to information, a
significant improvement to the decentralized access methods used in the
United States and the United Kingdom.
As a miniature centralized database, however, the smart card risks
mission creep. 3 59 At this point, it will help to invoke the technology pre-
mise.3 60 Since South Africa's smart card represents a significant advance
in identification technology, certain technological aspects of the identifica-
tion procedure should be explored. The previous discussion rejected only
one facet of the smart cards as incompatible with privacy interests-syn-
chronizing the smart card with the centralized database of fingerprints and
personal information. 3 61
Yet, the smart card maintains a separable, internal identification
method that matches the holder's fingerprint with the fingerprint electroni-
cally stored on the smart card.36 2 If the holder's fingerprint does not
351. Id.; see also, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 297.201 (1999) (limiting access to Civil Service per-
sonnel records unless written request submitted and identity sufficiently established);
cf. Dale-Murphy v. Winston, 820 F.2d 1470, 1476-77 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring request
conforming to regulations before even recognizing a claim for access under the Privacy
Act).
352. Supra Part L.A (describing the problems with large-scale databases as inherent to
the systems without regard to the entity that stores the information); see also note 346.
353. E.g., Germosen v. Cox, No. 98 Civ. 1294 (BSJ), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17400
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1999) (dismissing a Privacy Act claim to recover records from Ameri-
can Airlines and New York Telephone related to plaintiff's wire fraud conviction);
Steadman v. Rocky Mountain News, No. 95-1102, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34986, at *4
(10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995) (unpublished table opinion) (dismissing Privacy Act claim in
disability discrimination case against plaintiff's former employer).
354. Compare Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, § 7 (Eng.), with Privacy Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1999)).
355. Supra note 236 and accompanying text.
356. Supra Part IL.B.3 (discussing the potential for smart cards as means for citizens'
access).
357. Supra notes 305,329 and accompanying text (noting that South Africa continues
to develop its information control strategy and projecting consistent facets of the strat-
egy from known information, where necessary to fill gaps in the discussion).
358. Supra notes 233-43 and accompanying text.
359. Supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
360. Supra Part III.B.
361. Supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
362. Dep't of Home Affairs, supra note 208 (describing one identity verification pro-
cedure as "stand-alone verification, which reads the [fingerprint] on the card").
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match the stored print, the smart card could be limited to only verification
requests. 363 Since the identification measures ensure that only the verified
holder of the smart card has complete access, the smart card minimizes the
danger of other people appropriating the personal information on the card
for purposes beyond those originally conceived for the device.364 Thus,
integrating the technological solutions for identity verification directly into
smart cards functions to prevent risks of mission creep.
Privacy concerns necessitate one final modification to the smart card
system as proposed in South Africa. Given South Africa's long tradition of
identification documents, the country's cultural reaction differs signifi-
cantly from the responses in the United Kingdom and United States.365
Accordingly, the structural solution's smart card would not be used for
identification purposes. Instead, the smart cards would be supplied to citi-
zens as government-sponsored devices with identity verification safe-
guards.366 The smart card's purpose would be specifically to fashion an
interface and infrastructure that empowers citizens to access public and
private databases containing personal information. The internal finger-
print identification protection, lack of centralized identity verification pro-
cedures, and limited purpose for citizens' convenience combine to
minimize the possibility of using the smart card as a mandatory identifica-
tion document.
D. Domestic and International Impact of the Structural Solution for the
United States
From this discussion, the following structural principles emerge to guide
the establishment of a government system that respects privacy interests in
363. E.g., supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text (introducing the verification-
only feature).
364. Compare supra notes 362-63 and accompanying text (discussing a stand-alone
information access and verification device), with supra note 306 and accompanying text
(relying on the idea that information flows easily between networked systems, supra
note 51-52 and accompanying text). Although beyond the scope of this Note, the infor-
mation on the smart card would also require significant procedural protection from
police investigation and government appropriation. See Simpson, supra note 16.
365. Compare supra note 205 and accompanying text (describing South Africa's rela-
tive comfort with identity documents), with supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text
(describing the United Kingdom's brief touch with a national identification card and
debates over a new card).
366. The smart cards would need to be government-sponsored to facilitate uniform
legislation of standard protocols and other infrastructure requirements, similar to the
growth of the Internet. Vint Cerf, A Brief History of the Internet and Related Networks
(last visited Feb. 21, 2000), at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/cerf.html. How-
ever, the smart card would also need specific protections from the government. For
example, the costs of the system may outweigh the privacy benefits if law enforcement
officers could obtain warrants for the information contained on the smart cards. Cf.
Simpson, supra note 16 (describing the FBI's use of an information reference service to
circumvent Privacy Act restrictions on government profiling). Since the smart card's
role serves to reduce the burden on the citizen for information access, these concerns do
not pose a serious difficulty because smart cards are only one means of providing the
structural value of centralized information access. Unfortunately, this Note cannot fur-
ther explore these issues.
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the context of technological advances that risk unnecessary and excessive
dissemination of personal information.
1. Information Management: Governments should structure data distribu-
tion so that personal information resides on a decentralized network of
databases maintained by individual government agencies or firms. Data
sharing of personal information between any databases on the network,
public or private, should be restricted to verification requests rather than
complete release of records.36 7
2. Privacy Enforcement: In addition to allowing individuals to pursue pri-
vacy suits in court, governments should structure mechanisms for pri-
vacy enforcement by vesting a government agency with the sole
responsibility and singular purpose to protect citizens' data privacy.3 68
3. Citizens' Access to Information: For the citizen's convenience, governments
should issue a smart card or other device capable of centrally organizing
an individual's personal information stored on public and private
databases. To secure the device from other applications, it should use an
internal user identification procedure, access databases directly instead
of storing the information on a centralized database, and limit users to
verification queries if the user does not pass internal identity
authentication.3 69
Taken together, these principles impose significant impediments to
invasions of data privacy. If implemented, the principles constitute a set of
operating facts that any organization seeking to collect, use, or disseminate
information would follow of necessity.370 Although it would not be impos-
sible to violate the principles, the numerous obstacles would place an over-
whelming burden on the organization seeking to maintain the violation,
and the diverse checks on the system would pose a high risk of discovery
and sanction.
Naturally, these principles do not incapacitate agencies and firms,
making invasions of privacy impossible. However, the impediments and
checks make privacy violations extremely difficult and discovery probable.
An agency or firm may find a means of accumulating vast quantities of
data outside the verification-only system; yet the government agency and
citizens' smart cards would have the capacity to detect any excessive collec-
tion of personal information by a single organization. If the agency or firm
also found some method for avoiding oversight-for example, by failing to
register their database as a collection of personal information subject to
government oversight and smart card data retrieval-then it would be diffi-
cult to detect the violations. However, the agency or firm would need to
operate in complete stealth on a black market of information exchange
because at any public hint of the practices, the government privacy agency
could institute an investigation to ensure compliance with privacy
principles. 3 7 1
367. Supra Part V.A.
368. Supra Part IV.B.
369. Supra Part IV.C.
370. E.g., supra note 277 and accompanying text.
371. Supra 348-49 and accompanying text.
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Understanding how the impediments function within the structural
solution, the potential impact of such a system in the United States unfolds.
The most beneficial effect stems from a return to the values inspiring a
rights-based model. 372 The structural solution levels the information con-
trol inequities by conferring upon citizens an active role in enforcing their
interest in personal information. In addition, internationally, the solution
would conform the United States to the European Union's data privacy
protections.
The structural solution revives the underlying values of the rights-
based model in promoting individual autonomy and empowering citizens
as active participants in society. In particular, the smart card gives individ-
uals an effective means of policing organizations' use of personal informa-
tion. This power essentially reorganizes the information control structure
so that individuals need not be beholden to agencies and firms for per-
sonal information in order to receive services.373 Agencies and firms may
still request information, but even if released to the organization, the indi-
vidual retains the ability to monitor the use of personal data.
Autonomy necessitates control of identity through personal informa-
tion.374 Citizens should have the power to define themselves without unso-
licited interference from external sources. Allowing organizations to
collect and use personal information strips citizens of the power to define
themselves because it places the burden on the citizen to obtain services
outside his database profile.375 The transaction costs to obtain outside
information will limit the extent to which a citizen will be able to establish
an identity other than the profile controlled by the organization. 376 By
using the smart cards and defining their public identity, individuals
become an active player in ensuring the consistency and accuracy of both
the public and private aspects of an information society.
Moving to the international impact, the United States would comply
with protective measures restricting transborder flow of personal informa-
tion outside the European Union.377 Since October 1998, the United
States had attempted to demonstrate to the European Union that adequate
372. Supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
373. Supra note 156 and accompanying text.
374. Cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that forcing individuals to sacrifice their identity by regulating personal appearance
is inconsistent with valuing privacy and autonomy). This use of autonomy should not
be confused with the technical usage as the autonomy branch of the right to privacy-
"independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Supra note 80 and
accompanying text. While the technical use would be limited to decisions related to
fundamental activities, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978), the
current, broader use refers to any activity reflecting free choice, supra note 244.
375. Cf. Sovern, supra note 16, at 1090-91 (indicating that consumers lack the
resources to effectively manage their interaction with businesses).
376. Eg., id. at 1074-78 (describing diverse transaction costs that inhibit consumers
from opting out of personal information databases kept by firms).
377. Data Privacy Directive, supra note 3, art. 25.
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protections exist in the United States to safeguard data privacy.378 The EU
did not recognize any sufficiently binding privacy protections in the United
States and disagreed with the U.S. policy of self-regulation, which allows
businesses to define the methods used to protect privacy. 379 This impasse
led to the safe harbor exceptions.380 In contrast, instituting the principles
of the structural solution would likely satisfy the stringent requirements of
the Data Privacy Directive. 381 Consequently, by implementing the struc-
tural solution, the United States would not be left advocating a position
inconsistent with the policies of other developed countries and contra-
dicting its own values in autonomy and an active citizenry.
Conclusion
Advances in technology challenge traditional notions of privacy everyday,
provoking a privacy crisis. As personal data becomes the currency of the
information age, the importance of recognizing a privacy right in data
capable of revealing detailed information about individuals grows. For this
reason, national identification numbers serve as an excellent context to
explore the technological implications of even small pieces of information
and the data privacy models available to safeguard that information.
If it even exists, a right to data privacy in the United States has steadily
declined in scope and effectiveness since the 1970s. The United Kingdom
enacted strong protections for data privacy, but suffered significantly from
an inability to take advantage of the conveniences offered by technological
advances. South Africa has embarked on a unique and ambitious project
to balance privacy interests while exploiting the improvements of available
technology, but the proposal is deeply rooted in a cultural acceptance of
identification documents. As yet, none of these countries has implemented
a system that reveres individual privacy and benefits from technological
advances within a culture that distrusts national identification.
Any effort to structure such a system must organize the flow of infor-
mation between organizations and individuals so that individuals retain
control of the collection, use, and dissemination of personal information.
The U.S. right to privacy has been unable to give individuals this form of
378. Deborah Hargreaves, U.S. Aims to Break Data Privacy Deadlock, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 12, 2000, at 8.
379. Sylvia Dennis, Italy Urges Truce in U.S.-E.U. Data Privacy Battle, NEWSBYTES, Feb.
9, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, NWSBYT File. But cf. BBBOnline, FEDMA, Eurochambres
Move to Create International Trust Initiative for E-Commerce, Bus. WIRE, Apr. 23, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File (noting the efforts of European and U.S. business
groups to formulate international self-regulation standards for e-commerce).
380. Supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
381. Compare Data Privacy Directive, supra note 3 (requiring databases be restricted
in duration to limit unwarranted uses and excessive release of information, id. art. 6;
appointment of controller to ensure compliance with Directive's provisions, id. art. 6;
and rights conferred on individuals to access stored personal information, id. art. 12),
with supra Part IV (detailing principles for restricting data storage and sharing to limit
unwarranted uses and excessive release of information, id. at A; appointing a single
agency to enforce privacy protections, id. at B; and enabling individuals to access stored
personal information, id. at C).
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information control over personal data. Accordingly, a different approach
may be required. The privacy right's underlying values, however, should
not be ignored.
While both the United Kingdom and South Africa's systems suffer
from inadequacies, the countries offer distinct comparative models from
which ideas for U.S. modifications could be drawn. An analysis of specific
aspects of the countries' approaches to national identification best informs
a possible solution. While adopting the United Kingdom's loose database
structure and powerful privacy enforcement provisions, the solution's most
unique aspect uses a modified version of South Africa's smart card propo-
sal. Bringing these aspects together, the resultant structural principles for
a privacy protection framework respect traditional values in individual
autonomy and an active citizenry and recent international privacy values.
Although theoretical, these principles provide the groundwork for shaping
legislative reform to pull the United States out of its privacy crisis and
renew commitments to empowering citizens with the ability to control their
lives and identity.
